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Islam kay iss markaz say huwi taqdees ayan azaadi ki 
Iss baam-e-haram say goonji hae so bar azaan azaadi ki 
 
From this center of Islam the sanctity of freedom was made manifest 
From this minaret of the Sacred Mosque the call to freedom was proclaimed a 
hundred times 
 
Quoted above is a verse from the official school anthem of the Dar-ul-Uloom 
(House of Knowledge), Deoband, established in the Northern part of India 10 years 
after the crushing defeat suffered by the natives of the Indian sub-continent at the 
hands of their British colonizers in what came to be known as the Mutiny of 1857. 
Arriving in India as merchants under the auspices of the British East India Company 
first in 1608, the British had been consolidating their control over the vast and varied 
territories of the Indian subcontinent for over a century, but their success in meeting 
the challenge posed to their growing authority in 1857 firmly established them as the 
imperial power in India. In the years that followed, the East India Company was 
abolished as was the façade of continuing Muslim Mughal rule, and the 
administration of India became the direct responsibility of the Crown. Natives were 
punished for their rebelliousness; Muslims bore the brunt of British reprisal, and 
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ensuing British reform measures were seen as formidable threats to the preservation 
of their culture and religious identity.  
Their defeat at the hands of the British was a rude awakening for the Muslims 
of India, and spurred several simultaneous reform and revival movements, each 
aimed at redressing what its leaders considered to be the causes of Muslim decline. 
One such movement, known as the Aligarh Movement, was founded by the 
influential modernist Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, who believed that Muslim revival could 
be achieved only by assimilating Western culture, acquiring a Western education, and 
reinterpreting Islam based upon reason as understood in modern Western 
philosophy—a modernized, secularized version of Islam that would be in conformity 
with modern science and notions of progress1. Another movement, known as the Ahl-
e-Hadith, developed as the South-Asian version of the Wahabi movement in Saudi 
Arabia, its followers consisting mostly of well-educated Muslims who rejected the 
Islamic jurisprudential tradition as well as institutionalized Sufism in favor of a more 
literalist interpretation to the Quran and hadith (sayings of Prophet Muhammad).  
The madrassah (Islamic seminary) at Deoband, and the movement associated 
with it, was founded by a group of ulama (sing. alim), traditional Islamic scholars, 
who were prompted by Muslim defeat at the hands of the British to also consider 
deeply the causes of Muslim failure and decline. While it is commonly believed that 
its founders participated actively in the Mutiny of 1857, and the more radical of its 
students alleged that the purpose of the institution was to train revolutionaries, the 
ulama of Deoband were primarily committed to the preservation, revival, and 
 
1 Fuad S. Naeem, A Traditional Islamic Response to the Rise of Modernism, in Islam, Fundamentalism, 
and the Betrayal of Tradition, edited by Joseph E. B. Lumbard, p. 
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dissemination of traditional Islamic knowledge. They focused on nurturing the inward 
faith and reforming the outward practice of Indian Muslims according to traditional 
Islamic teachings, resisting the threat of foreign influence on the one hand and 
modernist and puritanical reform movements on the other, while also purging the 
practice of the religion of reprehensible innovations.  
While the institution maintained throughout an apolitical official posture and 
focused on the dissemination of knowledge regarding correct belief and practice, 
some of its leading ulama found themselves deeply involved with the most important 
political issues of the day— resistance against British rule in India, preventing the 
abolition of the Muslim Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey in the wake of World War I, 
and later, partition of India and creation of the separate nation-state of Pakistan for 
the Muslims of the sub-continent. At times, this brought them into direct 
confrontation with the British authorities and, more significantly, often entered them 
into conflict with each other. Though very few of their writings are dedicated to 
detailed explications of their understanding of Islamic political doctrine, the approach 
that the ulama took to politics, the relative enthusiasm with which they participated in 
it, their stances vis-à-vis each other, the justifications for their respective positions, 
and the means through which they made their relative positions known, provide 
invaluable insights into their political thought.   
The political ideas of the ulama of Deoband are important because of the 
impact they had on the political scene at the time and because of their continuing 
influence on contemporary political movements in South Asia. However, they are 
also crucial for students of Islamic political thought because they offer insights into 
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the traditionalist approach to politics, the institution at Deoband having been 
established as a bastion of traditional Islam in the sub-continent, its ulama committed 
to safeguarding traditional Islamic teachings and methodology in the face of 
challenges from modernist and fundamentalist elements. 
While the modernist and fundamentalist approaches to politics have gained 
much attention in the West in recent years, the same is not true for the traditionalist 
approach. Western scholarship has produced extensive literature on modernism in the 
Islamic world, as well as on their opponents in fundamentalist groups, but has not 
sufficiently studied the vast majority of Muslim intellectuals and scholars who 
produced work in continuity with traditional Islamic ideas and methods. This may be 
in part because advocacy by modernist Muslims of the same principles, processes, 
and institutions that the Western world wishes to see implemented in Muslim 
countries makes the promotion of the modernist approach advantageous to the 
Western agenda. On the other hand, not only do fundamentalists and Islamists attract 
attention to themselves in dramatic, often heinous, ways, they are also widely 
discussed, and denounced, as a foil to the Western/modernist approach.  
Traditional ulama have themselves for the most part shied away from politics, 
unwilling to participate in the corrupt and corrupting political systems existing in 
most Muslim countries so as not to lend credence to them and fearing that even minor 
successes in the existing framework would require too many compromises on 
adherence to the Sacred Law. On the other hand, active opposition to the existing 
order is considered either illegitimate from the Islamic perspective, given that 
classical jurists considered only a very high degree of excesses by incumbent rulers as 
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justifying the creation of public unrest against them, or at best a futile exercise that 
could, in fact, be counter-productive. The traditional ulama, such as the ulama of 
Deoband, have instead preferred to focus on the task of educating and training the 
minds and hearts of believers in the teachings of the religion as a way to bring about 
change in the status quo. They have, as a result neither exerted themselves to produce 
scholarly works on politics, most of the recent literature on Islam and politics being 
produced either by Islamists or modernists, nor have they been very active in 
advocating their positions on different political issues. Their wariness, as we will see, 
is in fact a function of their very approach to politics. 
As a result of this mutual lack of interest in developing and promoting 
traditionalist political thought, only the modernist and Islamist/fundamentalist 
approaches have gained popularity, and notoriety, as political “ideologies” emerging 
from the Muslim world. Both offer formulas aimed at correcting the political and 
social problems ailing the Muslim world. While modernists point to the success of 
their proposed solutions in the non-Muslim world as evidence for their assertions, 
Islamists tout the example of the earliest community of Muslims established by 
Prophet Muhammad in Medina as the Kingdom of God on Earth that will result from 
the successful implementation of their proposals. The push for their respective 
agendas enters modernists and Islamists/fundamentalists into a passionate struggle 
with each other, both considering the proposals of the other mutually exclusive to 
their own. It is this drama that the world often witnesses.  
 However, I contend that a third alternative, the one offered by the 
traditionalist ulama offers a much more balanced approach to politics; one more 
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firmly rooted in the letter and spirit of the original sources of the religion for those 
who care about authenticity than either the modernist or fundamentalist approaches, 
and one more organically linked to the history of Islamic civilization. Furthermore, 
while it has often been assumed that the traditional ulama have become utterly 
redundant, fixed in a historically remote time and completely removed from the 
concerns of the day, and therefore of little interest to anyone seriously interested in 
solving the problems of contemporary Muslim societies, the very course of the 
development of their ideas in history is testimony to the opposite. Theirs has been an 
approach that engages new challenges while consciously maintaining an 
incontrovertible link with the past in a systematic, even scientific, manner, and 
provides a more dynamic alternative to modernist and fundamentalist political 
thought. While it is the modernists and Islamists/fundamentalists that in pushing for 
the implementation of particular forms and specific strategies are limiting the 
possibility of growth and change, the traditionalist approach offers not a particular 
model of political organization and behavior but a methodology and a set of 
considerations that allows for variation and change across time and space and in the 
face of changing circumstances. It puts forward a way to merge the seemingly 
irreconcilable claims of modernist and fundamentalist political thinkers and activists 
to flexibility and pragmatism on the one hand, and ageless and unalterable principles 
on the other, responsiveness to changing needs and circumstances on the one hand 
and alleged commitment to a paradigmatic past on the other. 
The engagement in politics of the ulama of Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband provides 
insight not only into the broad themes in the traditionalist approach to politics, but 
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also provides an example of the dynamism of the traditional approach and its 
relevance as a political philosophy for the Muslim world in contemporary times. 
While there are many contending claims to Islamic political doctrine, with trends as 
widely divergent as modernism and fundamentalism claiming to most faithfully 
embody the spirit of Prophet Muhammad’s teachings pertaining to politics, the 
traditionalist framework within which the ulama of Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband 
formulated their political positions constitutes a relatively under-studied but 
particularly authoritative approach, if degree of connectedness to the past is a 
compelling measure of authenticity. Though its systematic academic study has been 
neglected by political scientists, being seen as more appropriately belonging to the 
discipline of religious studies, understanding the traditionalist model of politics could 
suggest solutions to root problems plaguing the practice of politics in the Muslim 
World today.   
Chapter 1 of this study describes the changing role of the ulama of the Indian 
sub-continent in the decades preceding the creation of Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband, under 
the Mughals and with the consolidation of British imperial power in India. Chapter 2 
proceeds to describe the innovative structure of the madrassah, its general orientation 
as compared with other important contemporary trends within Islamic thought, and its 
particular legal and spiritual commitments within that orientation. Chapter 3 presents 
an account of the involvement in politics of the more politically engaged of its ulama,
while Chapter 4 draws out the theoretical implications of this engagement for 




THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE INDIAN ULAMA
UNDER THE MUGHALS
Mughal rule was established in the Indian sub-continent by Babar, the great-
grandson of the Central Asian Mongol leader Taimur (Tamerlane), when he defeated 
Ibrahim Lodhi, the last of the Delhi Sultans, in the First Battle of Panipat in 1526. 
The empire continued to expand under Babar’s descendents, and rule over it was 
consolidated, until the death of the Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707, after which it 
entered a period of slow and steady decline that ended 150 years later when the 
British abolished Mughal rule and exiled the last Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah 
Zafar, to Burma. Though the majority of the population of India was Hindu, its 
Mughal rulers were Muslims of varying commitments, from the heretical Akbar, 
founder of a new religion, to the ultra-orthodox Aurangzeb Alamgir. However, in the 
period of political stability under the Mughals from the 16th century until the decline 
of Muslim power in India in the 18th, men of religious knowledge consistently 
occupied a very important position.  
Men of learning who played an important political role during Mughal rule 
included the ulama who were trained in Persian and Arabic, and in two broad 
categories of academic disciplines, the manqulat or ‘transcribed’ subjects of Quran 
and hadith, and the ma’qulat or ‘rational’ sciences ranging from Arabic grammar and 
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rhetoric to logic, mathematics, philosophy, theology and, above all, books of Islamic 
law and jurisprudence,2 and were the acknowledged experts in the external dictates of 
the Shari’a. Also influential were Sufi masters whose esoteric knowledge was based 
on a direct experience with the Divine and who guided their disciples in meeting the 
demands of the Shari’a pertaining to their inner lives. Usually, both outward and 
inward knowledge of the religion were combined in one person, and a man came to 
be known as alim or Sufi according to which kind of knowledge he emphasized.  
Being educated as an alim in this period was a sure route to respectability, and 
often to prestige and influence. The Muslim courts prided themselves on their cultural 
attainments, among which religious learning held an important position, and so “the 
intellectuals among them were sought out as adornments to the various entourages of 
the nobility.”3 The ulama were responsible for the education of the nobility; they 
staffed various levels of the judiciary, and oversaw the charitable establishment of the 
empire. The leading members of the ulama served in capacities that ranged from 
prayer leaders in town mosques to the most influential of advisors and courtiers. 
Ulama and Sufi masters were influential not only in the official capacities that they 
served, but also wielded an independent moral authority, to which not just courtiers 
but even kings submitted, especially as disciples.           
There were several reasons for the attachment of religious scholars to the 
royal courts and the nobility. Surely, advancement of their careers and financial 
security for themselves and their families were considerations that led to acceptance 
of formal appointments, even at the expense of religious principles, as the rulers were 
 
2 Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900, p. 19 
3 Ibid, p. 19 
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prone to patronizing the more compliant ulama. A man could hence choose to 
become an alim not only because of commitment to his religious heritage but because 
it offered lucrative career prospects. However, many ulama associated themselves 
with the state in order to influence its decision-makers, even if this meant 
compromising on certain minor issues in order to achieve major compliances with the 
religious code.  
An example of this sort of attachment is in the career of Shaikh4 Ahmed 
Sirhindi (1564 to 1624), a prominent scholar and Sufi who frequented the court and 
cultivated relations with eminent nobles, many of whom became his disciples. He 
carried on extensive correspondence with political leaders, including the king, but fell 
in disfavor with the Emperor Jehangir, who found some of his remarks offensive. 
After being jailed for a year, however, he found favor again and became the recipient 
of royal patronage. Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi sought to gain an audience for his 
intellectual and religious views among the powers that be, and towards this end he 
lent prestige and dignity to patrons who furthered his concerns.5
At the same time that ulama lent their support to rulers who maintained order 
and provided a stable framework for the continuation of Muslim social and religious 
life, tolerating a certain level of deviance from divine law in view of the greater good 
that was attained by their counsel, they were also key figures in reform, even 
revolutionary, movements if the deviation was seen to go beyond tolerable limits. The 
same Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi, for example, who received patronage from Emperor 
Jehangir and was able to influence him considerably, led a rigorous campaign against 
 
4 The title Shaikh refers to Spiritual Master 
5 Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900, p. 22 
11
Jehangir’s father Akbar when Akbar claimed to have founded a new religion which 
combined the salient features of several different religions. It seems as if Shaikh 
Ahmed Sirhindi’s decision to work within or outside the system depended on an 
understanding of what was the most effective means to safeguard Islam in the sub-
continent at any given time, a tactical decision which recurs in the reform movements 
of later ulama and Sufi masters, including the personalities associated with Deoband 
over two centuries later. 
 
DECLINING MUGHAL RULE AND THE RISE OF BRITISH POWER
With the death of Aurangzeb, the last of the ‘Great Mughals’ in 1707, the 
breakup of the empire began. As the Mughal empire weakened, British control 
extended and gathered strength; by 1803 they had taken on the role of protectors of 
the now titular Mughal king. As they consolidated their rule, the British introduced 
policies that had a deep impact on many aspects of Muslim life, including the role of 
the ulama.
One of the most profound changes was in the administration of law. Muslim 
law, like the law of other communities, was codified and frozen. Traditionally, 
Islamic courts had relied upon officials known as muftis, who specialized in 
interpreting Islamic law and issuing edicts (fatwas) on a case by case basis, and qadis,
or judges who decided in accordance with these fatwas. It was precisely this 
flexibility and responsiveness to context that perturbed the British, and judicial 
discretion was seen by them as nothing more than sheer arbitrariness. In their search 
for a rationalized, fixed and authoritative code, they came to recognize only a small 
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body of classical legal texts as being the sole and unchanging repository of Muslim 
law.6 Furthermore, important issues such as the law of evidence and offenses against 
the state were based not on Islamic legal sources but on British law.7 The resulting 
“Anglo-Muhammadan law” was decidedly not the ulama’s legal tradition but a 
hybrid of certain legal classics and English common law and was increasingly 
administered by British officials. Through this development, the British were able to 
avoid their dependence on local ulama who were as a result deprived of the most 
distinctive aspect of their vocation, the interpretation of law, and the alleged 
arbitrariness of the scholars’ methodology was restrained. While muftis and qadis 
were initially retained as advisors, their positions were completely abolished by 
1864.8
The decline of the royal courts meant a blow to the patronage enjoyed by 
religious scholars and their institutions of learning. Grants to madrassahs became 
smaller and increasingly unreliable, and existing endowments were confiscated by the 
new British rulers.9 Ulama now had to seek independent sources of funding for their 
institutions.  
 The Mutiny of 1857, referred to by the locals as the War of Independence, 
challenged the hold of the British on the subcontinent. However, once decisively 
suppressed, it served to further entrench British control in India, with the ailing 
Mughal emperor exiled in disgrace to Burma, Mughal rule abolished, and India 
brought directly under the British Crown. Muslims were disproportionately blamed 
 
6 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, p. 23 
7 Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900, p. 49 
8 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, p. 25 
9 M. Burhanuddin Qasmi, Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband, A Historic Struggle against British Tyranny, p. 14 
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for their role in the Mutiny for the British believed that the hostility of the Muslims 
was rooted in their loss of political power, while the Hindus had fought from 
economic grievances, the former motive considered more threatening than the latter. 
British revenge was extensive in the countryside, but it was worse in the capital 
Delhi; the mosques of the city were occupied and madrassahs were razed 10 
THE RESPONSE OF THE ULAMA
The Mutiny of 1857 was crucial in shaping the consciousness and defining the 
future role for the ulama of the sub-continent. For one, it dispelled any illusions of 
continuing Muslim power, and brought into focus the weakness of the Muslims of 
India. The ulama believed that this weakness was the result of spiritual decline and an 
abandonment of the Islamic code of life—a departure from both the form and spirit of 
the Shari’a11. Ensuing reform efforts aimed at improving the Islamic quality of 
individual lives, and creating a community both observant of detailed religious law 
and committed to spiritual progress. It is significant that the ulama did not resort to 
blaming the enemy for the failure suffered by Muslims, but were rather introspective, 
identifying the causes of weakness to lie within. Whereas previously religious 
knowledge had been the concern of a limited elite, there was now to take place a 
popularizing of religious education, so that Muslims of all backgrounds and classes of 
society may be able to know and live their lives in accordance with the requirements 
of their religion.  
 
10 Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900, p 84-85 
11 Shari’a is usually translated as Islamic law. However, it includes the entire code governing private 
and public aspects of Muslim life, including, but not limited to, acts of worship, good manners, 
interpersonal relationships, business dealings, conduct of the state, etc. A more detailed explanation of 
Shari’a follows. 
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 A recognition of the weakness of the Muslims before their new foreign 
masters also sobered the ulama, as they by and large went out of their way to avoid 
offense to, and conflict with, the new rulers. They tended to leave the political and 
cultural capital Delhi, which had suffered the brunt of the revenge of the British, and 
moved to smaller towns which were less touched by British presence, and where they 
were less likely to be subject to interference by the new rulers. These towns now 
became the centers for the preservation of Muslim cultural and religious life. Barbara 
Metcalf points out: 
“The ulama in Muslim history have tended to oscillate between 
participation in the state and the exercise of independently based local 
leadership. The north Indian ulama, in choosing the latter style, thus 
adopted a well-known strategy with historical precedent. Again 
echoing precedent, they made the madrassah the institutional basis of 
their work.”12 
However, while most ulama and their institutions did not engage in overt political 
activity, the goal of freeing India from foreign domination formed the background of 
the educational endeavors of the community of scholars, and subtle means were 
adopted to create a political consciousness among followers and to disseminate their 
political views among the Muslim population of the sub-continent. 
 With Islamic law transformed into Anglo-Muhammadan law and dispensed by 
British court officials rather than muftis and qadis, fatwas were now issued directly by 
ulama to believers for their guidance. While they were no longer backed by the 
coercive power of courts, nor could they affect the workings of the state, they were to 
become a vehicle for disseminating ever more detailed guidance on everyday 
concerns to Muslims seeking to preserve their religious practice and identity under 
 
12 Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900, p. 87-88 
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alien rule. They took on a new importance given the uncertainty of the times, and 
established the ulama as the authoritative guides in those changing circumstances.13 
Muhammad Qasim Zaman notes: 
“Indeed, in colonial India, this function (of muftis) registered certain 
important changes: from the late nineteenth century, fatwas were often 
given on the authority of a particular madrasa, such as the madrasa of 
Deoband, rather than on that of a single jurisconsult; fatwas were 
issued in larger numbers than had been the case earlier; and the 
technology of print enabled the madrasas to disseminate their fatwas 
more widely and, in many cases, to begin publishing influential 
compilations of them.”14 
SUMMARY
During the Mughal era, men of religious knowledge, the ulama and 
mashaikh,15 wielded political influence on the ruling elite as their educators and in 
official capacities, and the latter in particular held informal clout as the spiritual 
guides of members of the aristocracy and even princes and kings. Though attachment 
to the state was the most profitable career option for religious scholars, they were also 
able to influence the ruler to govern according to the teachings of Islam, and this was 
the primary objective of association with the establishment for many of them. 
However, as legal experts and moral authorities they were also able to inspire and 
direct opposition movements against rulers who strayed too much from the revealed 
code, the choice of influencing the status quo from within or attacking it from without 
depending on a consideration of the course of action that under the circumstances 
would best serve the interests of the religion and of the Muslims of the sub-continent.  
 
13 Ibid, p. 50 
14 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, p. 25 
15 Plural of Shaikh, a Sufi master 
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With the rise of British power and the decline of Mughal courts, the ulama 
lost their influence on the establishment both in their formal and informal capacities, 
and the new rulers excluded them from their traditional role in the interpretation and 
administration of law. Fearing that being governed by a legal code not rooted firmly 
in the Shari’a and administered by non-Muslims would result in misguidance of the 
Muslims, the ulama resorted to issuing more profusely than ever before religious 
edicts called fatwas to disseminate instruction in the Shari’a. These were received 
readily, indeed demanded, by ordinary Muslims who turned to the ulama and 
mashaikh for guidance in these confusing times. The fatwas also served as the major 
instrument in the reform efforts of the ulama, who identified a departure from both 
the letter and spirit of the Shari’a as the cause of Muslim decline and used fatwas to 
correct the beliefs and practices of the masses. As we will see in the chapters to come, 
fatwas were also used to guide the political views and actions of the Muslims, and 





DAR-UL-ULOOM DEOBAND: A BASTION OF TRADITIONAL 
ISLAM
A DIFFERENT KIND OF MADRASSAH
The madrassah at Deoband was established by Maulana16 Rashid Ahmad 
Gangohi, Maulana Qasim Nanautvi, and others, under the guidance of their spiritual 
mentor, Haji17 Imdadullah Makki, in the town of Deoband in Northern India in 1867. 
Its modest beginnings were under a pomegranate tree in the compound of an old 
mosque, with one teacher and one student. However, from its very inception the 
school was unlike earlier madrassahs, replacing the informal pattern of education that 
the scene under the pomegranate tree conjures up, with the British bureaucratic style 
of educational institutions. The founders of Deoband knew such institutions well. 
Many of them, including three Deputy Inspectors of the Education Department, were 
government servants, while some others had attended British style educational 
institutions. They had thus gained close familiarity with the methods employed in the 
running of these institutions, and chose to compete with them on equivalent terms.18 
The school that evolved was, in its sources of funding, organizational structure, and 
 
16 The title for an alim, an Islamic scholar 
17 The title of someone who has performed the Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca.  
18 Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900, p. 92-94 
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goals, a very ‘modern’ institution, despite being a bastion of traditional Islamic 
education, and became a model for subsequent madrassahs to emulate.  
Traditionally, Islamic education was imparted by families dedicated to 
religious scholarship, in their own homes or in the corner of a mosque; there was no 
central library, no set course of study, and no series of examinations. A student would 
seek out a teacher for a particular book, and upon completion of his studies receive a 
certificate listing the books he had read and testifying to his accomplishment, 
allowing him to take on students of his own in that particular text. Upon receiving this 
ijazah19 he would move on to another teacher for another book, or return home. The 
number of books studied and the expertise of the scholars with whom he had studied 
became a measure of his own knowledge and ability.  
The ulama in such a setting had depended primarily on revenue from 
endowments and on the patronage of princes and aristocrats, and were part of the 
larger structure of a Muslim state.20 The Deobandi ulama, in contrast, had to secure 
funding through independent sources, and the mechanism hence introduced was one 
of the most striking, and innovative, characteristics of the school. Most of its income 
was derived from popular contributions pledged annually by a wide and varied base 
of supporters, the complex system requiring careful book-keeping and transparency in 
managing accounts, and relying on the new facilities of postal service, money orders 
and the printing press.21 
19 Permission, specifically granted to a student at the completion of a book to offer instruction in it 
himself. 
20 Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900, p. 94 
21 Ibid, p. 97 
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Another particularly striking feature of the new school was the participation of 
people with no ties of kinship: the school was not in the hands of a single family, 
subject to the understood and accepted norms of kin behavior. Rather, its staff 
consisted of personnel with specific responsibilities, and members were asked to 
demonstrate openness and tolerance in dealing with each other, engaging in mutual 
consultation not on the basis of position but on that of the value of their ideas.22 
The goal of the school was to train ulama well-versed in the different 
branches of Islamic knowledge, from both the manqulat and the ma’qulat, who would 
serve as prayer leaders, writers, preachers and teachers, and carry on the work of 
popular education, spreading instruction in “correct” Islamic beliefs and practices. 
They followed a set curriculum, basically the Dars-e-Nizami23 evolved at an older 
eighteenth century madrassah, but with a greater emphasis on the study of hadith,
which was to become the basis of their popular teaching. There were formal 
requirements for admission and matriculation, and students were expected to 
complete a course of study originally set for ten years, and later reduced to six. 
Students were regularly examined, an innovation in madrassah education that was not 
accepted without resistance, and prizes were awarded at the annual convocation to 
recognize those with the highest grades.24 
The ulama of Deoband early on tried to establish a network of schools on the 
pattern of British universities with their affiliated colleges. The administrative set-up 
of these branch institutions was modeled on that of the parent school, the modified 
version of the Dars-e-Nizami curriculum taught at Deoband was also followed here; 
 
22 Ibid, p. 95 
23 A syllabus of religious education current in South Asia from the eighteenth century 
24 Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900, p. 100-105 
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the schools often submitted their records to Deoband for inspection, sought its 
approval for major decisions, and received its ulama both as examiners and 
distinguished visitors.25 Many of these institutions were set-up by graduates of 
Deoband, and given the diversity of the student body at the parent institution, branch 
schools were opened over a wide geographic area; reportedly 8,934 affiliated 
madrassahs were established by the Dar-ul-Uloom’s centennial in 1967, and the spirit 
of reform developed at Deoband spread far and wide.   
Deoband became not just the name of an institution but of a particular 
orientation towards religious knowledge and the method of its transmission, and came 
to signify commitment to a particular legal methodology and style of institutionalized 
spirituality. As Professor Barbara Metcalf puts it, “The ulama and their schools were 
Deobandi. Increasingly, the name of Deoband came to represent a distinct style, a 
maslak, of Indian Islam.”26 Ulama were, and continue to be, defined as Deobandi 
because of their association with Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband, having studied in the 
school, one of its affiliated madrassahs, or any madrassah modeled after it, and 
because of their commitment to traditionalism, and in particular the legal and spiritual 
orientation fostered at the institution.  
 
25 Ibid, p. 125 
26 Ibid, p. 136 
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TRADITIONALISM, MODERNISM, AND ISLAMISM
Within Sunni27 Islam, the Deobandi reform movement, originating from the 
Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband, was characterized by an approach to the religion that was 
self-consciously ‘traditional.’ Referring to Islamic traditionalism, historian of 
religion, William A. Graham, says: 
“I mean by the term the long-standing, overt predilection in diverse 
strands of Islamic life for recourse to previous authorities, above all 
the Prophet and Companions, but also later figures…who are 
perceived as having revived (jaddada), reformed (aslaha), or 
preserved (hafiza), the vision and norms of true, pristine Islam, and 
thus as being in continuity with the original community, or ummah.
All such authorities function as interpreters of God’s revealed word 
and as paradigms for the present and future. An important concomitant 
of this attitude is a wariness or even abhorrence of any “innovation” 
(bid’ah) that runs counter to the perceived tradition. Thus, Naqshbandi 
or Bektashi Sufi thought can be just as traditionalist as Hanbali or 
Maliki legal thought”28 
This traditionalism consists, he says further, “not in some imagined atavism, 
regressivism, fatalism, or rejection of change and challenge,” but rather in the 
conviction that  
“a personally guaranteed connection with a model past, and especially 
with model persons, offers the only sound basis for forming and re-
forming oneself and ones society in any age. How one chooses to do 
that—and one must do it willy-nilly—is one’s own responsibility; 
Islamic history reveals myriad ways in which that has been attempted. 
Whatever its forms, being religious “Islamically” has meant taking 
history seriously and ultimately so, for history or, still more, biography 
(the history of persons) the prime medium through which authority and 
truth have been transmitted and thus made available for each new 
generation.”29 
27 Sunnis, or Ahl-as-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah (People of the Way (of the Prophet) and the community (of 
His companions), have constituted the majority of Muslims throughout Islamic history, and are 
distinguished from Shi’is and other theological offshoots from mainstream Islam.  
28 William A. Graham, Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation, Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, 23/3 (1993), p. 500  
29 Ibid, p. 522 
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What is crucial in this transmission is that documents alone, however authentic, 
ancient, and well-preserved, are of limited use as basis of authoritative transmission 
without a contiguous chain of persons of both knowledge and piety to teach and 
convey them across the years.30 The authenticity of this chain alone ensures that the 
transmitted knowledge, both zahiri (apparent) as in the knowledge of the jurists, and 
batini (esoteric) as of the Sufi masters, is the same knowledge that was revealed to the 
Prophet Muhammad by God, and taught by him to his companions. While Graham 
acknowledges that anchoring authority in the establishment of links with the past is 
not unique to Muslims, he argues that this effort is nowhere more pervasive than in 
Islam, and is institutionalized here to an unparalleled degree.31 
Fuad S. Naeem says about traditionalism in Islam: 
 
“From this perspective, traditional Islam refers to both the Quranic 
Revelation and the Prophetic Sunnah32 in themselves, as well as the 
subsequent life and activity of the Muslim community, whether it be in 
law, philosophy, art, mysticism, politics, or social life, which can be 
seen as a historical commentary upon, and continuity of, the original 
Revelation.”33 
Pitted against traditional Islam, and against each other, are the competing 
strains of ‘modernism’ on the one hand, and ‘fundamentalism’ or ‘Islamism’ on the 
other. About modernism in general, Naeem says that it refers to: 
“a world-view, with a whole body of ideas and their resultant 
institutions, that emerged in Europe as a result of the Renaissance in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and which revolted against 
religion in all the various areas of life and replaced it with humanism, 
rationalism, and secularism. As a result of these ideas, the Western 
 
30 Ibid, p. 507 
31 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, p. 4 
32 The Sunnah refers to the Way of the Prophet, which consists of his words and deeds, as well as his 
tacit approvals and disapprovals, and which has been taken as the perfect model for the life of every 
Muslim since the beginning of Islam. 
33 Fuad S. Naeem, A Traditional Islamic Response to the Rise of Modernism, in Islam, 
Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, edited by Joseph E. B. Lumbard, p. 80  
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world transformed itself from the Christian civilization of the Middle 
Ages to the largely secular humanistic civilization it has become in 
modern times. 
 
As for modernism in the Islamic world, it emerged, he says “from the direct influence 
of these foundational ideas of the modern West, often wed to the political and 
military power of colonialism.”34 
In assessing the impact of modernist thinking on the Muslim world, Joseph 
Lumbard says: 
“But as this mode of thought did not rise organically from within the 
Islamic intellectual tradition, its expressions in the Islamic world have 
consisted largely of warmed over Western ideologies under a thin 
veneer of Islamic terminology. Liberalizing modernists join with 
doctrinaire reformists in eschewing the great interpreters of the past, 
but go further, at times arguing for the abandonment of the Quran and 
Sunnah.”35 
Muhammad Qasim Zaman identifies modernism as an intellectual and religio-
political trend rooted in modern, secular, westernized institutions of education, and 
says about its rise in the Muslim world since the late nineteenth century: 
“Modernist Muslim intellectuals have sought, since the nineteenth 
century, to find ways of making Islam compatible with what they have 
taken to be the challenges of the modern age. And their proposed 
reforms have encompassed virtually the entire spectrum of life in 
Muslim societies. The intellectual vigor with which these reforms were 
proposed, and the success with which they have been carried 
through—often in alliance with the postcolonial state—has varied 
from one Muslim society to another, as have the precise ways in which 
different thinkers among these modernists have viewed the Islamic 
tradition and defined themselves in relation to it. More often than not, 
however, the effort has been to retrieve the teachings to “true” Islam 
from the vast and oppressive edifice that centuries of “sterile” 
scholasticism, “blind” imitation of earlier authorities, and the 
“intransigence” of the religious specialists had built. In general, the 
modernist project is guided by the assurance that once retrieved 
 
34 Ibid 
35 Joseph E. B. Lumbard, The Decline of Knowledge and the Rise of Ideology, in Islam, 
Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, edited by Joseph E. B. Lumbard, p. 68-69 
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through a fresh but “authentic” reading of the foundational texts, and 
especially of the Qu’ran, the teachings of Islam would appear 
manifestly in concord with the positions recommended by liberal 
rationalism.” 36 
On the other hand, Islamism developed in the Muslims world as a reaction to 
the excesses of modernism, although its proponents are often trained in the same 
modern, westernized institutions of education as the modernists. For Islamists, efforts 
by modernist Muslim states to marry Western, liberal rationalism and Islam have 
come at the expense of the latter, and they seek to radically alter their societies and 
states through the public implementation of norms they take to be “truly” Islamic. 
However, Zaman points out that while these Islamists position themselves against 
Westerns ideas and institutions in ways that are starkly different from the posture 
assumed by Muslim modernists, their own intellectual positions are often formulated 
in terms firmly rooted in the discourses of the modern age. Such is, for example, the 
case of the Egyptian Syed Qutb, one of the most influential Islamist thinkers of the 
twentieth century, who, in his conception of social justice, is more indebted to 
modern Western ideas than to the Quran.37 
Describing the general trend normally referred to in Western scholarship as 
“Islamism,” Naeem says: 
“Fundamentalism, or literal reformism, although it serves as an 
umbrella term comprising many different movements with different 
beliefs and aims, generally implies a rejection of traditional Islamic 
scholarship and especially its intellectual and spiritual traditions; it 
calls for a return to the Quran and hadith (the sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad), interpreting these primary sources of Islam in a purely 
literalist and exclusivist manner, often in opposition to the traditional 
understanding and interpretation of these sacred texts. The groups 
denoted by the term often have a puritanical emphasis and an agenda 
 
36 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, p. 7-8 
37 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, p. 8 
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for Islamic revival on a social and political level but with little interest 
in the spiritual and intellectual aspects of Islam.”38 
Joseph Lumbard refers to Islamists/fundamentalists as ‘stringent reformists’ 
and says about them that while they propose strict adherence to the Quran and 
Sunnah, inspiring many who yearn to live a more pious Islamic life, they do so by 
rejecting thirteen centuries of Islamic intellectual history, claiming that there is no 
need for help from thinkers of the past to understand and interpret the original 
sources. In the absence of such guidance narrow ideological interpretations of the 
faith comes\ to predominate, with those who fail to adopt this interpretation seen as 
unbelievers, or at best misguided.39 
Naeem assesses the stance of Islamism/fundamentalism and modernism vis-à-
vis traditional Islam as follows: 
“Neither fundamentalism nor modernism is integral to Islamic 
civilization: both are reactions to the modern secular Western world, 
which has dominated the Islamic world for the last two centuries, first 
politically and militarily through colonialism, and later ideologically 
and culturally. They are also both united in their opposition to 
traditional Islam.” 40 
Lumbard analyzes it similarly in the following words: 
“Liberal modernist Muslim thinkers and radical reformist activists are 
two sides of the same coin. Whereas medieval thinkers like Ghazali 
were able to analyze and utilize intellectual tools from outside 
influences, radical reformists reject them outwardly while submitting 
inwardly, and modernists attempt to patch them onto the fabric of 
Islam, some claiming that they have been a part of that fabric all along. 
Both movements represent a subversion of traditional values and 
teachings from within the Islamic tradition. In an effort to transform 
 
38 Fuad S. Naeem, A Traditional Islamic Response to the Rise of Modernism, in Islam, 
Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, edited by Joseph E. B. Lumbard, p. 80 
39 Joseph E. B. Lumbard, The Decline of Knowledge and the Rise of Ideology, in Islam, 
Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, edited by Joseph E. B. Lumbard, p. 68 
40 Fuad S. Naeem, A Traditional Islamic Response to the Rise of Modernism, in Islam, 
Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, edited by Joseph E. B. Lumbard, p. 80 
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Islamic civilization, each has in fact hastened the onset of the very 
illnesses they sought to ameliorate. Rather than contemplating and 
evaluating Western civilization through the Islamic intellectual 
tradition, modernists have embraced many tenets of Western thought 
out of a deep sense of inferiority—a sense which results from 
mistaking the power of Western nations for the truth of Western 
ideologies. Finding these movements within their midst, the reformists 
have retreated to fanatical adherence and pietistic sentimentalism.”41 
While the hallmark of traditional Islam is a demonstrated connectedness with 
the ideal community of believers around the Prophet, taught and trained in every 
aspect of the religion by Prophet Muhammad himself, modernism and 
Islamism/fundamentalism/ literal reformism represent breaks with the past by 
abandoning the methodology that establishes this continuity, despite claims to greater 
authenticity for having ascertained the Will of God directly from the revealed 
sources. As Naeem and Lumbard point out, the principles that the modernists identify 
as embodying the Divine Will are more an outcome of their western, secular, liberal 
education than rooted in the Quran and Sunnah (though the two are not always 
mutually exclusive); the rejection of the need for specialized training and isnad42 in 
interpreting the original sources allows them to read their viewpoints into selected 
verses of the Quran and reject either the entire body of hadith or any narration that 
does not support their point of view. As for the Islamists, they also reject the entire 
corpus of elaborations, qualifications, differences of opinion, and interpretations in 
the multiple branches of the traditional sciences in favor of simplistic, single 
interpretations also allegedly drawn out from the Quran and Sunnah.
41 Joseph E. B. Lumbard, The Decline of Knowledge and the Rise of Ideology, in Islam, 
Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, edited by Joseph E. B. Lumbard, p. 69 
42 A chain of transmission of knowledge, whether a saying of the Prophet, an interpretation of a verse 
of the Quran, or a legal opinion 
27
For modernists, Islam’s claim to universality necessitates its reduction to 
loosely-defined principles such as justice, equality, and human dignity, and justifies 
an almost wholesale adoption of the most popular social, political, and cultural ideas 
and forms at any given time; most present-day Muslim modernists, for instance, are 
strong advocates of democratization in the Muslims world, in the style of Western 
liberal democracy. For fundamentalists, touting the slogan “Islam is the solution,” 
Islam’s alleged applicability across time and space means an enforcement of their 
literal and unchanging interpretation of the Shari’a irrespective of context. Lacking a 
sophisticated interpretive methodology and displaying a self-righteous disregard for 
history, Islamist ideals are often utopian, the way to them often ambiguous.  
The traditionalist orientation within Sunni Islam, while its claim to 
authenticity rests on its connectedness with the past, employs complex methodologies 
to first understand the multiple dimensions of the Quranic paradigm and the Prophetic 
example, and to then translate the principles enshrined therein into pertinent 
directives governing every aspect of life in any number of temporal and spatial 
contexts. Given that the predominant trend in Islam has always been of the 
traditionalist variety, it is precisely this flexibility and the existence of systematic 
methods for interpretation that has enabled Islam to live up to its claim of validity for 
vastly different times and places, and has allowed it to successfully meet the 
challenges posed by changing circumstances, while its rootedness in the foundations 
of the religion have ensured the preservation of its distinct character.                             
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LEGAL AND SPIRITUAL TRADITION OF DAR-UL-ULOOM DEOBAND
Islamic intellectual history is the history of attempts to identify and explicate 
what God has intended for humanity, and how best the Divine Will can be realized by 
believers in different times, in different places and in the face of changing 
circumstances. Traditional ulama recognize a difference between Shari’a, which 
refers to the totality of God’s commandments, His Will as revealed in the Quran and 
exemplified by the Sunnah of His last Prophet and Messenger, and fiqh, which refers 
to the body of specific rulings derived from the Shari’a. The Shari’a consists of two 
basic categories of laws: the definitive, which are explicit and decisive, do not allow 
for interpretation, and the speculative, in which difference of opinion is allowed, 
taking into account human weakness and as a mercy to believers;43 it is this second 
category of by-laws which is the subject matter of fiqh. The difference between the 
Shari’a and fiqh has been defined as follows: 
“The scope of the Shari’a is wider than that of fiqh. It comprises 
beliefs (‘aqa’id), rituals (ibadat), civil and social transactions 
(mu’amalat), and ethics (akhlaq), while fiqh comprises only rituals 
(‘ibadat) and social transactions (mu’amalat). The Shari’a is the 
textual law, while fiqh is the derivative law. Hence there might be no 
disagreement in the Shari’a, whereas there is disagreement in fiqh,
since it has been derived by the jurists.”44 
At the time of Prophet Muhammad, while the various branches of Islamic 
knowledge (such as the sciences of Tafseer or Quranic exegesis, Hadith collection 
and categorization, Tajweed or Quran recitation, Tasawwuf or Spirituality, etc.) were 
not codified as they came to be later on, different companions acquired expertise in 
different areas under the guidance of the Prophet, and the others deferred to their 
 
43 Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhalwi, The Differences of the Imams, p. 33 
44 Ibid, p. 2 
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authority in those fields. One of these areas of specialization was that of fiqh. While 
the Prophet was the ultimate authority on all matters during his lifetime, and his 
words, actions, and even his tacit approval on the actions of others became a part of 
the Shari’a itself, he taught his companions to use their judgment in his absence, 
regarding matters that were not explicitly dealt with in the Quran and Sunnah. For 
instance, on the occasion of appointing the famous companion Mu’az ibn Jabal, later 
referred to by the Prophet as the “Leader of the scholars in Paradise”, to the post of 
Governor of Yemen, the Prophet had the following conversation with him. The 
Prophet asked: ‘How will you judge the cases (that come to you)?’ He replied: ‘I will 
judge according to the Book of Allah’. ‘But if you do not get anything there, what 
will you do?’ the Prophet asked. He said: ‘I will refer to the way of the Prophet’. ‘But 
if you do not get it even there, what will you do?’ the Prophet asked again. He 
replied: ‘I will exercise my judgment.’ Hearing this, the Prophet patted Mu’az on the 
shoulder and said: ‘Praise be to God who has guided the Messenger of His Messenger 
to what pleases His Messenger’.45 
The Prophet also allowed for more than one interpretation of his own sayings 
during his lifetime, and in fact declared that difference of opinion among the 
knowledgeable ones of his community was a mercy and blessing. For example, on 
one occasion the Prophet commanded a group of companions, setting out for a 
journey, to perform their Asr46 prayer at their destination. Some of the companions 
took this command literally and delayed the prayer from its actual time to fulfill what 
they understood to be the meaning of the command issued to them. Others regarded 
 
45 Found in the collection of sayings of the Prophet (pbuh) by Nisa’i: No. 1327 
46 The Asr prayer is the third of the five daily prayers mandatory on Muslims; it is performed in the late 
afternoon and its time ends with the setting of the sun. 
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the words of the Prophet to be a command to reach their destination in haste, i.e. by 
the time of the Asr prayer. Hence they performed the prayer at its appointed time, en-
route to their destination. When the difference between the companions was later 
presented to him, the Prophet did not disapprove of the actions of either of the two 
groups.47 
The rulings of the companions who specialized in passing legal judgments on 
novel matters not addressed directly in the Quran and Sunnah were formulated in the 
light of the overall objectives of the Shari’a, where possible by recourse to analogy 
with established precedents in the original sources. Their differences and agreements 
were both passed down to subsequent generations of students through sound chains of 
transmission, their consensus recognized as authoritative and not open to further 
debate and interpretation.  In the third generation territorial expansion and the 
intermingling of cultures coupled with material developments gave rise to a large 
number of new questions, as well as doubts about transmitted opinions. The need was 
felt to systematize the methodology for deriving rules to avoid inconsistencies, and 
the principles on which the transmitted opinions were based were inferred by leading 
scholars of the time based on knowledge of Arabic grammar, syntax, theology, the 
textual material of legal relevance in the authoritative sources, and acquaintance with 
methods employed by the companions themselves.48 While they agreed with each 
other on basic matters of belief and worship, they differed on a wide variety of minor 
points, perhaps because the Arabic could be understood in more than one way, or 
because the particular Qur'an or hadith text admitted of qualifications given in other 
 
47 Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhalwi, The Differences of the Imams, p. 34-35  
48 Ahmad Hasan, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 17 
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texts, some of them acceptable for reasons of legal methodology to some scholars but 
not others49, or because the same act of the Prophet could be regarded as either 
coincidental and so without any legal bearing, or willful and so a part of the Shari’a50.
Apart from these and many other reasons for differences to arise, they also held 
somewhat different approaches to the law, being, for instance, more or less stringent 
in the criteria for making an act mandatory, or more or less flexible in adopting 
customary practices.    
These principles were systematically compiled, giving rise to the science of 
Usul-ul-Fiqh (Foundations/Principles of Islamic law) and later used for the derivation 
of further rules in response to new questions arising with changing circumstances 
across time and space, right to the present day. The differences among scholars about 
what these principles were, based on the transmitted differences among the 
companions, gave rise to many different schools of law, all of them being fruits of 
attempts to interpret God’s will as contained in the flawless and ageless textual 
sources (Shari’a) to arrive at derivative law (fiqh). Out of these four have survived in 
their entirety, the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali, named subsequently after their 
founders; they evolved in the ninth century, and each is considered equally valid and 
legitimate by the others.  
The recognition that the derivation of fiqh from the Shari’a was the outcome 
of fallible human effort allowed not only for the acceptability of a variation in legal 
rulings across the different schools of law, but the same general principles applied to 
 
49 Nuh Ha Mim Keller, Why Muslims Follow Madhhabs, 
http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/nuh/madhhabstlk.htm
50 Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhalwi, The Differences of the Imams, p. 20 
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different contexts also led jurists to rule differently within a particular mazhab51,
depending on the circumstances. In the Hanafi school, for instance the same act, e.g. 
marriage, could fall into any one of the main categories of legal rulings, being haram 
(prohibited) at the one end, and fard (mandatory) at the other, and all shades in 
between, depending on the circumstances under consideration52. Furthermore, 
because customary practice (‘urf) that did not contradict the Shari’a was an accepted 
source of law on a variety of issues, especially in the Hanafi mazhab, fatwas by 
Hanafi scholars could differ from one cultural context to another without 
compromising the consistency of the methodology. Also, while adherence to one 
school of law, rather than picking and choosing between them, was highly preferred 
to maintain consistency and to ensure that individuals did not simply follow rulings 
that were in accordance with their desires, jurists from one school could rule 
according to the laws of another if, for instance, applying the methodology of the 
school yielded a ruling that was deemed excessively difficult to follow.   
Each school was associated with a particular geographic area within the 
Muslim world, with the Hanafi school of law being widespread in the Indian sub-
continent. The ulama of Deoband believed in taqlid, the necessity of following an 
established school of law, and from among the four schools were dedicated followers 
of the Hanafi mazhab.53 This set them apart from the modernists and Ahl-e-Hadith 
51 School of law 
52 If a man, for instance, is sure that he will engage in fornication—a major sin in Islam—it would be 
mandatory for him to marry. If on the other hand, he is sure that he will be abusive towards his wife, it 
will be forbidden for him to enter into a marital relationship.  
53 For a traditionalist response to objections against following a school of law, see Nuh Ha Mim Keller, 
Why Muslims Follow Madhhabs, http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/nuh/madhhabstlk.htm, and Abdul 
Hakim Murad, Understanding the Four Madhhabs,
http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/ahm/newmadhh.htm
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who were staunch opponents of taqlid and claimed that every Muslim could, and 
should, interpret for themselves the original sources and derive rulings to govern 
individual and collective action. 
Besides believing in the necessity of taqlid and following one of the four 
established schools of law, adherents to a traditional approach to Islam typically 
recognize the validity, indeed the indispensability, of institutionalized Sufism, often 
being pledged into one of the established Sufi orders. While the sciences of Fiqh and 
Usul-ul-Fiqh were developed by generations to come to preserve and build on the 
outward teachings of the Messenger of God, so the science of Tasawwuf, or Sufism, 
evolved to preserve and transmit the teachings of the Prophet pertaining to the 
acquisition of certain states of the heart (of humility, gratefulness, attentiveness 
towards God, detachment from worldly pleasures, sincerity, etc.) and elimination of 
certain others (of greed, lust, envy, boastfulness, anger, etc.). Just as the Prophet 
taught his companions the outward postures of the mandatory prayer, for instance, so 
also he conveyed to them the spirit behind it; the internal state of absolute surrender 
to God that must ideally be experienced as a believer physically prostrates before his 
Creator. Just as he taught them, for example, that the consumption of alcohol was 
prohibited, so also he made it clear that arrogance was a major sin and must be 
eradicated from a believer’s heart, for a mustard seed worth of arrogance could 
prevent a person from entering Paradise. The fuqaha (experts in fiqh) tell the believer 
that it is recommended to praise God upon completion of a meal, for instance, while it 
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is the Sufis who transmit to them a state of gratitude to God for even the smallest 
morsel of the plainest bread.54 
Tasawwuf is considered by adherents to the traditional approach to Islam to be 
as necessary for the complete implementation of Sacred Law, the Shari’a, in one’s 
life as is fiqh, for it is necessary for the attainment of a state of the heart demanded by 
the Quran and Sunnah55 and to obey the commands of God and His final Messenger 
pertaining to one’s innermost thoughts, feelings, and intentions.  As the famous 
Muslim historian Ibn Khaldun writes: 
“Sufism belongs to the sciences of the Shari’a that originated in Islam. 
It is based on the assumption that the practice of its adherents had 
always been considered by the important early Muslims, the men 
around Muhammad and the men of the second generation, as well as 
those who came after them, as the path to truth and right guidance. The 
Sufi approach is based upon constant application to divine worship, 
complete devotion to God, aversion to the false splendor of the world, 
abstinence from the pleasure, property, and position to which the great 
mass aspire, and retirement from the world into solitude for divine 
worship. These things were general among the men around 
Muhammad and the early Muslims.”56 
Just as the transmission of knowledge of legal rulings cannot take place 
simply through an independent study of books containing this knowledge, but rather 
has to be acquired from a qualified teacher, so also must intense love for God, 
commitment to executing His will, deep pleasure in worship, purification of the self 
(tazkiyat-e-nafs), indifference towards the temptations of this world, ihsan (beauty or 
excellence) in one’s dealings with God and others, and other desirable internal states 
be attained by sitting at the feet of a qualified instructor. In fact, the relationship 
 
54 From a speech by Shaikh Kamaluddin Ahmed, Islamabad, Pakistan, January 3, 2005 
55 For more on a traditionalist approach to Tasawwuf, read Nuh Ha Mim Keller, The Place of 
Tasawwuf in Traditional Islam, http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/nuh/sufitlk.htm 
56 Quoted in Joseph E. B. Lumbard, The Decline of Knowledge and the Rise of Ideology, in Islam, 
Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, edited by Joseph E. B. Lumbard, p. 48 
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between student and teacher is at the heart of the learning process in Tasawwuf, and 
one becomes a salik, a traveler on the spiritual path, by pledging allegiance to an 
accomplished Sufi master.  
Just like in the evolution of fiqh, there also evolved different streams within 
Tasawwuf, each with its own approach to the attainment of the same goal, its own 
style of meditative practices, and its particular division of the spiritual journey into 
stages or lessons. With time, four main Sufi orders became best known—the 
Naqshbandi, Chishti, Qadiri, and Suharwardi— each named after a key individual in 
the chain and each tracing back to the Prophet through a close companion. Once a 
seeker reached a certain level of spiritual development, he received an ijazah, an 
authorization by his teacher to take on disciples of his own, and since multiple 
students of the same teacher could receive authorization in this manner, there 
developed many different branches of the four main orders. The various Sufi orders 
have their origins in the teachings of Prophet Muhammad just as much as the 
different schools of law—a measure of authenticity of any particular branch of any 
order being, in fact, whether the Sufi masters of that particular stream are linked to 
the Prophet through an uninterrupted chain of students and teachers. 
The Deobandi ulama were devoted not only to Hanafi law but also to Sufi 
doctrine and practice. Many leading Deobandis were trained in the Chishti method, 
but were strongly influenced by the practices and general approach of the Naqshbandi 
order, towards sobriety in spiritual experience and rigorous adherence to the 
Shari’a57. Their approach to Tasawwuf was much different from the popular 
understanding and practice of Sufism at the time; they eschewed and in fact taught 
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against deviant customary observances, and challenged the centrality of tombs of 
dead saints and the networks of support for them. While the Sufism of the masses 
emphasized the intercessory role of the Sufi saint in ensuring salvation, the 
Deobandis considered central the individual responsibility of each disciple to develop 
spiritually by adhering to Divine Law and practicing the Sunnah, and in fact affirmed 
that the most advanced mystic was the one who most successfully emulated the 
Prophetic example.58 
SUMMARY
The Islamic seminary at Deoband was established as a bastion of traditional 
Islam, though its founders saw no contradiction between its purpose and its uniquely 
modern structure and organization; this view was expressed by Maulana Ashraf Ali 
Thanvi, one of the most revered Deobandi scholars, as follows: 
“Imitation of the disbelievers (kuffar) in the matters of religion is 
forbidden and in matters of customary practice is gravely disliked.  In 
the remaining matters of inventions and administration, it is 
permissible and in actuality this is not considered imitation anyhow.”59 
The traditional orientation within Islam is marked by an emphasis on isnad, an 
uninterrupted chain of transmission connecting the present with the paradigmatic 
community of believers developed by Prophet Muhammad during his lifetime, and 
also of his surviving companions after his death, which is the prototype for “human 
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society properly ordered under God’s ordained norms.”60 Knowledge is transmitted 
within this tradition—both outward knowledge about the form of worship, standards 
of behavior governing interpersonal relations, business transactions, political activity 
etc. and intimate knowledge of the Divine—from teacher to student such that the last 
student in any chain of transmission is linked through a string of known “servants of 
God” who have embodied the ideals of the original prophetic community, to the 
Prophet Muhammad himself.   
However, the body of transmitted knowledge did not remain static. On the 
contrary, it grew at every stage, never weakening its link to the teachings of the 
Prophet, but ever-expanding in the light of new ideas and in the face of new 
challenges. Sophisticated methodologies developed in the various religious sciences, 
most prominently that of Islamic law, to engage novel ideas and respond to the latest 
challenges; the sciences of Fiqh (and Usul-ul-Fiqh) and Tasawwuf grew to preserve 
and ensure adherence to the prophetic paradigm pertaining to believers’ outward 
actions and their inner states respectively.  
 While there are several variations within the two opposing trends of 
modernism and Islamism/fundamentalism/literal reformism, the Aligarh and Ahl-e-
Hadith movements surfacing in India around the same time as the traditionalist 
Deobandi Movement being versions of the two, both approaches are marked by a lack 
of connectedness to the past on the one hand, and want of methodologies to creatively 
engage new ideas and challenges on the other. The former deficiency results in a 
departure from the teachings of the Quran and the Prophetic example, while the latter 
amounts to a wholesale adoption of alien ideas in the case of modernism, and 
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simplistic, decontextualized responses to contemporary needs in the case of Islamism/ 
fundamentalism/literal reformism.    
 The political involvement of the ulama of Deoband, and the reasoning on 
which it was based, are firmly rooted in their traditionalist orientation. An 
understanding of this orientation vis-à-vis other major trends within Islamic thought 
provides the framework within which to develop an alternative theory of politics to 
the two extremes proposed by modernist thinkers on the one hand, and 
fundamentalists/Islamists on the other; an approach to politics that balances 
commitment to the teachings of Islam and connectedness with the Prophetic example 





POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT OF THE ULAMA OF DEOBAND
PARTICIPATION IN THE MUTINY OF 1857
It is today widely accepted that the ulama of the period were actively involved 
in the struggle against the British. The author of the biography of Maulana Husain 
Ahmed Madani, one of the most politically active of the Deobandi ulama, says in his 
preface: 
“The ulama were the first to give warning against the threat to India’s 
political power and cultural life from the British who came seeking 
trade facilities and, through cunning manipulation of contradictions 
among local rulers and chieftains, became the rulers over this rich 
country. It was their inspiration in the main that resulted in the first 
great uprising in 1857 which the British called the Mutiny and 
patriotic Indians termed as the First War of Independence.”61 
One group from among the heirs to the ulama of Deoband claim that the 
founders of the school were actively involved in the uprising, even organizing a 
counter-government and engaging in military revolt during September 1857 in the 
town of Thanah Bhawan.62 On the official website of the institution, under the 
heading ‘Dar-ul-Uloom in the Fight for Freedom’ it is stated: 
“The ulama of Deoband, with resoluteness and trust in Allah, have 
always been not only in the foremost rank of those who have struggled 
in the movement for the independence of India but they have also 
frequently been in the lead of this movement for independence; and if 
it is seen more thoughtfully and justly, they were the first persons, the 
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pioneers, who initiated this idea. The warmth, vigour and catholicity 
which was created in this movement in fact is indebted to them. Most 
of these gentlemen raised the banner of revolt against the English 
government, fought face to face with the English army and many of 
them passed a good part of their lives in jail. The fact is that the history 
of the independence movement of India is so mixed up with the history 
of the ulama and religious personalities that it is now difficult to 
separate one from the other.”63 
In fact, from this perspective, the creation of the institution in 1867 was an 
extension of the ulama’s struggle for independence from the British colonizers. 
Maulana Mahmood-ul-Hasan, a disciple of the founder of the school Maulana 
Muhammad Qasim Nanautavi and the school’s first student, who was later to be 
incarcerated for his activities against the British, is quoted as having said regarding 
the establishment of Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband: 
“As far as I know, after the failure of uprising of 1857, it was decided 
to establish a centre (institution) where people could be trained to 
overcome the failure of 1857.”64 
This view of the role of the ulama in general, and of the founders of the 
school at Deoband in particular, in the Mutiny of 1857 has been contested and 
downplayed by others, even from among the Deobandi ulama. According to a leading 
historian of the ulama of this period, Barbara D. Metcalf, the motives behind the 
uprising were complex and varied, and leadership was accordingly diverse. She notes 
that even for the Muslims, the ulama were only one kind of leader, with landlords and 
tribal and family chiefs being of great importance as well. In some regions the role of 
the ulama was, in fact, minor as compared to the landlords, who could mobilize both 
financial and human resources, and their overall role in the revolt was at best 
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fragmentary and divided.65 Referring to the claim about the insurgency in the town of 
Thanah Bhawan she says: 
“This account has been invariably accepted, yet this view of events at 
Thanah Bhawan, identifying the posts of each member and the course 
of the uprising, appears only in secondary sources written after about 
1920. Earlier biographies argue that the accusations of involvement 
were those of enemies, and that the ultimate release from jail of Rashid 
Ahmad, who spent six months confined, and the fact that Muhammad 
Qasim was never arrested, testify to the loyalty of both men.”66 
Furthermore, as Metcalf points out, there had been considerable debate over 
the legitimacy of fighting the British at this time. Ulama close to the group that 
founded the school at Deoband rejected its validity on the grounds that taking up arms 
against an enemy was only legitimate from an Islamic standpoint when there was 
reasonable hope of success.67 However, regardless of how directly and actively the 
ulama were involved in the Mutiny of 1857, they were perceived by the British to 
have played an important role in the uprising and were accordingly punished, and, as 
has gone before, reforms were introduced to curtail their influence. While most ulama 
in the decades to follow did not directly confront the new rulers in recognition of their 
relative weakness, they saw the Mutiny as a sign of British barbarity and British rule 
as a threat to their religion and culture, and resentment against the colonizers festered 
as a result.  
 
POST-MUTINY POLITICAL ACTIVISM
The two Deobandi scholars most known for their political activism were 
Maulana Mahmood Hasan, the very first student of the school and later one of its 
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most famous teachers and fourth principal, and his student at the Dar-ul-Uloom,
Maulana Husain Ahmed Madani. So as not to implicate the institution in any anti-
government activity, Maulana Mahmood Hasan founded other institutions that on the 
surface were educational establishments, and indeed functioned as such, but which 
also served as covers for anti-government activities. He was also involved in setting 
up other organizations with overtly political agendas, which eventually led to an 
arrest warrant being issued against him by the British government.  
Eventually, in the wake of World War I, he led the way to planning an armed 
insurrection against the British, to garner support for which he dispatched his deputy 
Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi to Afghanistan, to mobilize the frontier tribes against the 
British. However, the Amir of Afghanistan had been bought by the British and was 
creating dissentions among the frontier tribes to curtail their imminent threat to the 
British. Maulana Mahmood himself proceeded to Mecca in an attempt to establish 
connection with the Turkish governor of the Hijaz68, hoping to obtain the support of 
the Muslim Caliph in Turkey for the proposed revolution against the British in India; 
the timing of his departure from India allowed him to narrowly escape arrest by the 
British. In Mecca, the Turkish governor endorsed the struggle of the Indian Muslims 
against the British, and signed a declaration of war that was dispatched back to India; 
an endorsement of the proposed armed insurrection and support of Maulana 
Mahmood Hasan as its leader by the deputy of the highest Muslim authority, the 
Caliph, would, it was thought, unite the dissenting frontier tribes behind the cause. 
The Turkish governor was also requested to facilitate Maulana Mahmood’s passage 
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to Istanbul so that a meeting could be arranged with the Caliph himself, a request 
which the governor accepted. 
However, before this plan could be realized, the Arab revolt against the 
Ottomans began at the instigation of the British, led by Sharif Hussain, who had been 
ruling Mecca on behalf of the Ottomans. To justify the revolt, Sharif Hussain 
attempted to secure a fatwa from the ulama in Mecca that declared the Ottoman Turks 
to be infidels. Maulana Mahmood Hasan’s signature was also sought; if he was to 
sign the fatwa, the British policy towards Turkey would be justified and the anger of 
the Indian Muslims towards the British for their designs against the institution of the 
caliphate would be pacified, and if he were to refrain from signing it there would be 
reason for the Sharif of Mecca to hand the Maulana over to the British. Maulana 
Mahmood refused to sign the fatwa and both him and Maulana Husain Ahmed 
Madani, who had been residing and teaching in Medina for several years after having 
migrated there from India for personal reasons and who had hosted and had been 
helping his former teacher in the Hijaz, were arrested and sent to Malta, where they 
were imprisoned for three years.69 
Upon his return to India from Malta, Maulana Mahmood Hasan realized that 
his earlier plans of armed insurrection against the British with the help of foreign 
support had no longer any scope in India, and he channeled his continued resentment 
against British rule towards support for the Non-Cooperation Movement led by 
Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, the dramatic change in strategy 
reflecting dynamism and pragmatism in his approach to politics. He endorsed their 
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agenda by issuing a celebrated fatwa that was signed by hundreds of other ulama.70 
The fatwa read as follows: 
“On return from Malta I have learnt that the leaders of India have 
adopted a final path to carry out their obligations and to defend their 
sentiments and rights, that is, that they should stick to the tenets of the 
Holy Quran and follow the great and good tradition of the Prophet and, 
accordingly, assess the pros and cons for the nation and thereupon 
fearlessly carry out the program; that path is none other than 
cooperation with the forces inimical to Islam. The issue before us is 
not contrary to the Shari’a. The honorable course for a true Muslim 
can only be that (i) he should return the honors and decorations 
conferred by the government, (ii) refuse to join the councils currently 
proposed, (iii) use only indigenous products, and (iv) not put his 
children in government schools and colleges. Besides, all the 
resolutions passed from time to time should be strictly followed. Care 
should however be taken that (a) in carrying out these resolutions 
nothing contrary to the Shari’a should be done, (b) whatever threatens 
violence or is likely to disturb peace should be avoided and in every 
respect moderation be preferred to extremist action. Hazrat Usman71 
says, “When people are doing good work, join them, and when they 
turn to evil, keep away from it.” This saying should ever be kept in 
mind.”72 
Maulana Mahmood Hasan passed away shortly after his return from Malta, 
and Maulana Husain Ahmed Madani was acknowledged as the heir to his political 
struggle.  Maulana Husain had initially left Madina, where he had established himself 
as a teacher of hadith, and joined Maulana Mahmood Hasan in Mecca simply to 
support and serve his former teacher, and not with the intention of getting involved in 
the Indian struggle, though he was in agreement with its goals and with the strategies 
employed by Maulana Mahmood Hasan.73 The period of internment in Malta, 
however, allowed him the opportunity to interact with political prisoners from around 
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the world, all incarcerated because of their resistance to British colonial rule, and his 
political resolve was strengthened. 74 Upon his return to India from Malta—he had 
preferred to accompany his aging teacher over returning to Medina—and the demise 
of Maulana Mahmood Hasan, Maulana Husain plunged headlong into politics.       
Maulana Husain threw the weight of his support behind the Indian National 
Congress and the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Hind (Association of the Scholars of India), both 
of which urged unity between Hindus and Muslims in their common struggle against 
the British; it is from the platform of the Jamiat that he carried on much of his 
political struggle. On the one hand, he not only pushed the agenda outlined in his 
predecessor’s fatwa, which declared that the goals of the Non-Cooperation Movement 
were in line with the Shari’a, he went as far as to claim that any kind of cooperation 
with the British was, in fact, prohibited for Muslims, and that non-cooperation was 
the religious duty of every believer, remarks that were threatening enough to the 
establishment to lead to a brief incarceration.75 He practiced the principles of non-
cooperation with as much commitment as he preached them; it is reported that if 
someone offered him a bar of foreign soap to wash his hands he would refuse to touch 
it, and if he had to lead the prayer and discovered that the prayer mat was not 
indigenous he would remove it and pray on a straw mat instead.76 
While advocating non-cooperation with the British on the one hand, on the 
other Maulana Husain urged Muslims to cooperate with their fellow Indians of 
different religions in their joint struggle against British imperialism. The only way to 
overthrow British rule in the sub-continent, a goal which he felt was a primary 
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Islamic obligation of Indian Muslims under the circumstances, was for the Hindus 
and Muslims to work against it together; the seeds of Muslim nationalism were sowed 
by the British, he felt, as part of their policy of divide and rule. He said: 
“For this unity we need not merge our religious identities; no man of 
faith would tolerate it….Hindus as Hindus and Muslims as Muslims 
should come together and make efforts for the liberation of the 
country. All people should follow the advice of the leaders. It should at 
the same time be borne in mind that the enemy and its lackeys would 
try to break this unity by raising religion related problems and disrupt 
this unity. They should not be listened to and we should proceed with 
utmost care and perseverance.”77 
He argued that while the Muslims of India were a distinct religious entity 
from the other religious communities in the sub-continent, they were part of the same 
‘nation’ (qawm) as their Hindu compatriots, since a ‘nation’ was not constituted by 
ties of faith. He found justification for this concept from the depiction of prophets 
mentioned in the Quran as belonging to the same qawm as the infidels to whom they 
preached, and that Prophet Muhammad himself had created in Medina a ‘nation’ that 
constituted Muslims and Jews. The term ummah, while commonly used to refer 
exclusively to the Muslim community, could also, he claimed, be similarly used to 
include other communities. These were different, Maulana argued, from the concept 
of milla, which denoted a religion, a religious law, and a faith-based path as well as 
the community of those who follow it. Differences of religion were immaterial to the 
constitution of a qawm, just as they were central to a milla, and what Maulana Husain 
was arguing for was the creation of the former, and not the latter.78 
Maulana Husain’s rejection of Muslim nationalism was also based on his pan-
Islamic ideals, the concept that all Muslims, regardless of where they are in the world, 
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constitute one community, one milla; he considered it unacceptable that one segment 
of the universal community of Muslims define itself in territorial terms to the 
exclusion of Muslims elsewhere. In both implications of Muslim nationalism he saw 
the insidious designs of the British; on the one hand to weaken the struggle against 
imperial rule, and on the other to divide the global community of Muslims on the 
basis of territorial nationalism. After the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan 
he said remorsefully: 
“Partition has divided the interests of Muslims also. For instance, what 
is good for Pakistan may not necessarily be good for India; there can 
quite often be contradiction between the two. Similarly, what is good 
for Pakistani Muslims may not be good for Indian Muslims too. 
Indeed, it is quite possible that something may be quite useful for 
Pakistani Muslims but may spell disaster for Indian Muslims. In the 
face of such contradiction we have to choose between the interests of 
Indian Muslims and Pakistani Muslims.”79 
Maulana Husain’s advocacy of the idea of united or composite nationalism 
brought him into confrontation with the Muslim League, an increasingly popular 
political organization that proposed that the Muslims were a separate nation from the 
Hindus and for which the demand for a separate state for the Muslims of the sub-
continent took precedence over the demand for British departure from India; indeed, a 
separate homeland for the Muslims must be created while the British were still in 
power in India. While the Muslim League consisted largely of secular Muslims, it 
used the rhetoric of religious nationalism to inspire the masses, declaring Muslims to 
be a separate nation from the Hindus of India on the basis of their distinct religious 
identity, and hence deserving of a separate nation-state.  His position also entered him 
into a controversy with several leaders of Muslim opinion, such as the highly 
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influential modernist poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal who was a strong 
advocate of the Two-Nation Theory and believed that religion could be the only real 
basis for nationalism, and the well-known Islamist thinker, Syed Abul A’la Mawdudi.    
 
THE OTHER DEOBANDI PERSPECTIVE
Maulana Husain’s stance was also opposed by some leading Deobandi ulama 
who supported the cause of a separate state for the Muslims, seeing that as the only 
way to ensure the preservation of Islamic culture and identity. Among these was 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, who lent his support to the Muslim League, and his 
nephew Maulana Zafar Ahmad Uthmani, who was among the founders of the Jamiat-
e-Ulama-e-Islam (Association of the Scholars of Islam), a political party formed in 
1945 by ulama that disagreed with the united nationalism of the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-
Hind.
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi was skeptical about Muslim participation in the 
Non-Cooperation Movement on the grounds that it employed methods that were 
contrary to the Shari’a, and illegitimate means cannot be used to attain even the 
noblest of ends. Even though a boycott of foreign goods was in itself a permissible act 
according to the Shari’a, the way it is used by enthusiasts of the Non-Cooperation 
Movement, argues Maulana Thanvi, made it impermissible. Volunteers had been 
appointed at shops where British goods were sold, and shop-keepers were either 
prevented from selling them, or if they did sell them the buyers were forced to return 
them, even though Islamic law allows for business transactions, save in a few specific 
items, even with a country with which the Muslims are at war. This caused unjustified 
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losses to the shopkeepers and subsequent financial hardship upon their families. 
Forcing the buyers of the foreign goods to return the purchased items after the 
completion of the contract was also illegal according to the Islamic laws of buying 
and selling. Furthermore, shopkeepers and their customers who refused to comply 
were penalized, which constituted oppression.80 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi’s political stance on the issue of partition seems 
to be motivated primarily by his concern for Muslim culture and identity, which he 
believed was under threat at the time. It is this concern that led him to discourage his 
followers from being too involved with non-Muslims; he considered the domination 
of the Indian National Congress by non-Muslims in itself a serious deterrent from 
attachment with the organization, even before ideological differences came to a head. 
Initially, he even disapproved of joining organizations headed by irreligious Muslims, 
advising that one should only agree to work in an organization of pious Muslims, for 
only then could one safeguard his religion.81 
However, it is this same concern for Muslim identity that led him to 
eventually lend support to the Muslim League and its agenda of a separate state for 
the Muslims of India, to safeguard Islam from its enemies who would be bent upon 
destroying it after Indian independence. While this meant participation in an 
organization of “irreligious” Muslims, and endorsing the establishment of a state on 
what were, despite the rhetoric, clearly political and nationalistic rather than religious 
grounds, he considered his choice as the lesser of two evils, and in guiding his 
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followers towards it, he was in fact acting upon the principle in fiqh of accepting the 
lesser harm to avoid the greater harm when only two options are available. He hoped 
that once Pakistan came into being, he and his followers could guide the otherwise 
misguided Muslim Leaguers in running the state more in accordance with the Shari’a;
he was willing to encourage the nationalistic associations with Islam that they played 
upon in the hope that perhaps eventually the connection with Islam will strengthen.82 
He advised one of his disciples and another famous Deobandi scholar, Maulana 
Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani: 
“It seems that the Leaguers will be successful and whatever (Muslim) 
state will be established will be governed by them whom we now call 
fasiq awr fajir (big sinners).  If through your efforts these (Muslim 
Leaguers) become religious and honest, and if they are the ones who 
govern the state, then it is all right.  We are not interested in governing 
a state.  Our sole aim is that whatever (Muslim) state is established that 
should be in the hands of religious and honest persons so that Allah’s 
din (way of life) reigns supreme.”83 
In the hope of attaining this goal, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani continued to 
remain active in Pakistani politics after the country was created in 1947. 
Maulana Husain Ahmed Madani’s concept of united nationalism was also 
strongly contested by Maulana Zafar Ahmad Uthmani, among the founders of the 
competing organization of traditional ulama in India, which supported the creation of 
Pakistan. A refutation of the concept takes the form of a short treatise embedded in 
the twelfth volume of a monumental commentary on hadith by Maulana Uthmani, the 
I’la al-Sunan. Maulana Uthmani argues that a united nationalism would be 
acceptable according to the Shari’a if the Muslim were in the majority so that their 
law and culture defined the law and culture of the land; however, a unified nation in 
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which non-Muslims are the majority would result in the destruction of Islam, and 
would therefore be prohibited according to the Shari’a. Thus defining united 
nationalism in a way that necessitates loss or privatization of religion and the eventual 
destruction of Islam, he proceeds to use numerous Prophetic sayings that warn against 
intermingling of religions, and emphasizes the importance in Islamic law of 
maintaining sharp boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims. Maulana Uthmani 
also critiques the adoption of civil disobedience as the preferred means of proponents 
of united nationalism on the grounds that it was not rooted in the Prophetic Sunnah
and, in fact, compromised it. While he does not explicitly articulate it, Maulana 
Uthmani’s arguments in the treatise suggest that the only viable way in which the 
future of the Muslim community can be secured it for Muslims to have a state of their 
own 84 
SUMMARY
Regardless of how active the founders of Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband had been in 
the Mutiny of 1857 against the British, and notwithstanding the place of political 
ambitions in the goals they set for the institution, several of its leading ulama found 
themselves involved in the most important political movements of the day in the 
decades following the establishment of the institution. In their role as Islamic legal 
experts and spiritual guides, the fatwas they issued and advice they imparted to their 
students and disciples, or other believers searching for answers in highly confusing 
times, conveyed their positions on various political issues. Furthermore, as self-
conscious bearers of truth and leaders of an Islamic reform and revival movement, 
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they found it unjustifiable to remain inactive in the face of what they perceived to be 
clear threats to Muslim culture and religious identity in the sub-continent, and were 
driven by a keen sense of accountability before God to participate in politics to the 
required extent. 
Despite their strict adherence to a traditional approach to Islam, and within 
this approach their shared allegiance to the Hanafi legal methodology and Maturidi 
theology85, and their common approach to Tasawwuf, in many cases even sharing the 
same spiritual lineage, the political opinions of the ulama of Deoband were far from 
identical. Perhaps the greatest uniting force among them was their sincere 
commitment to the preservation of “true” Islam in the face of threat from antagonistic 
foreign rulers on the one hand, and a corrupted understanding and practice of even the 
essentials of the religion by its own followers on the other. Their common 
understanding of the purpose of their work, indeed their lives, and a common spiritual 
and intellectual training are precisely what caused them to differ with each other on 
the best means to achieve the desired end, and they considered it their duty to God 
and their fellow Muslims to promote their own opinion and denounce the opinion of 
their fellow ulama if they considered their own position more conducive to their 
common goals than the stance assumed by their colleagues. Their difference of 
opinion was perfectly legitimate in their capacities as fuqaha, as elaborators of the 
Shari’a. As a result, from among the elders of Deoband were ulama who participated 
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actively in the resistance against the British, suffering persecution and incarceration 
for their activism, and others who questioned the wisdom, even legitimacy, of such 
confrontation. Some scholars in this group opposed the cause of a separate nation-
state for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent, pushing instead the agenda of 
United Nationalism, while others were highly critical of this stance and supported the 
partition of India and the creation of Pakistan.  
More than the actual positions that they took, which were merely responses to 
particular situations and cannot be essentialized as models of political behavior, the 
very fact that they differed with each other, and the basis of their disagreement, are 
highly instructive in formulating a theoretical framework for politics within the 





SALIENT FEATURES OF TRADITIONALIST POLITICAL 
THOUGHT
POLITICS AS THE MEANS TO NON-POLITICAL ENDS
Perhaps the most important feature of traditionalist Islamic political thought is 
that politics from this perspective is no more than a means for the achievement of 
non-political ends. Hence, while the goal of politics is indisputable, universal and 
timeless, not only is difference of opinion over its form acceptable, even desirable, 
but political engagement is completely dispensable when it ceases to serve as the best 
means to achieve the desired end. Furthermore, just like other disagreements in the 
non-fundamentals of the religion, the parameters of this debate are defined by the 
Shari’a. Any political agenda, process, structure, form of resistance etc. is 
unacceptable if it conflicts with the Shari’a in any way; the end does not justify the 
means. The disagreement between the ulama of Deoband who advocated non-
cooperation and united nationalism, led by Maulanas Mahmood Hasan and Husain 
Ahmed Madani, and of those ulama that opposed their stance, led by Maulanas 
Ashraf Ali Thanvi, Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani, and Zafar Ahmad Uthmani, reveals this 
definitive feature of traditionalist Islamic political thought. While it may seem 
obvious that politics is a means and not the end, it is a significant departure from the 
actual political agendas and strategies of modernist and Islamist political thinkers and 
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activists, even if their rhetoric claims otherwise, and many other important aspects of 
traditionalist Islamic political thought stem from this basic premise.         
The non-political end of politics within the traditionalist paradigm is no 
different from the overall and ultimate purpose of human life on earth specified in the 
Quran and hadith; engagement in politics is a facet of this worldly existence and like 
every aspect of a believer’s life on earth it too is geared towards the achievement of 
the purpose for which every human being was created. This purpose is the attainment 
of Divine pleasure through submission to God’s will as enshrined in the Shari’a,
emulation of the Prophetic example, and establishment of acts of worship, which 
results in the cultivation of a deep connection with Him in this world, and admission 
into Paradise in the Hereafter. Politics is merely a tool for the attainment of this goal, 
and where it ceases to facilitate this end, it is no longer ‘Islamic,’ even though it may 
be given this title.86 In one of his works Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi expresses this 
view of the end of politics and quotes the following verse from the Quran is support 
of his stance, “(They are) those who, if We establish their reign in the land, establish 
regular prayer and give regular charity, enjoin the right and forbid wrong; with God 
rests the end (and decision) of (all) affairs.”87 
One of the leading contemporary Deobandi ulama, Mufti Taqi Uthmani 
discusses the common misunderstanding about the place of politics in Islam by 
Muslim thinkers today in a treatise elaborating on the political thought of Maulana 
Ashraf Ali Thanvi. While Islam, being a complete code of life, presents many rulings 
concerning politics, and a believer must accept and act on those principles just as 
 
86 Justice Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, Hakeem-ul-Ummat Kay Siyasi Afkar/Political Thoughts of 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, p. 27-29 
87 The Holy Quran, chapter 22, verse 41 
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much as on other divine proclamations, considering politics to be the goal set by 
Islam would be as ridiculous as to suggest that business transactions, about which the 
Shari’a also sets very specific conditions, is the end of Islam. Mufti Taqi laments the 
fact that many Muslim thinkers and writers have gone to the extreme in their 
opposition to secularism, and have understood and declared the acquisition of 
political power and the effecting of political reform to be the goal of Islam; instead of 
‘Islamizing politics’, they have ‘politicized Islam’. In doing so, they have reversed 
the order of priorities, and relegated even acts of worship and divine injunctions to 
the status of mere means towards the attainment of political ends; this is particularly 
dangerous because means can be altered or compromised to facilitate the achievement 
of the goal.88 
Mufti Taqi and Maulana Thanvi’s concern about the reordering of priorities 
appear confirmed when one looks at the writings of the highly influential Islamist 
thinker mentioned earlier as a strong opponent of Maulana Husain Ahmed Madani’s 
position, Syed Abul A’la Mawdudi. He considered the attainment of political control 
and the establishment of an Islamic political order as the ultimate form of worship, 
with acts of worship such as prayer, fasting, and the remembrance of God, as methods 
of discipline and training. He says about the goal of Islam: 
“Islam wants the whole earth and does not content itself with only a 
part thereof. It wants and requires the entire inhabited world. It does 
not want this in order that one nation dominates the earth and 
monopolizes its sources of wealth, after having taken them away from 
one or more other nations. No, Islam wants and requires the earth in 
order that the human race altogether can enjoy the concept and 
practical program of human happiness, by means of which God has 
honored Islam and put it above the other religions and laws. In order to 
 
88 Justice Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, Hakeem-ul-Ummat Kay Siyasi Afkar/Political Thoughts of 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, p. 24-26 
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realize this lofty desire, Islam wants to employ all forces and means 
that can be employed for bringing about a universal all-embracing 
revolution. It will spare no efforts for the achievement of this supreme 
objective. This far-reaching struggle that continuously exhausts all 
forces and this employment of all possible means are called jihad.”89 
And: 
“Islam is a revolutionary doctrine and system that overturns 
governments. It seeks to overturn the whole universal social 
order...and establish its structure anew...Islam seeks the world. It is not 
satisfied by a piece of land but demands the whole universe...Islamic 
jihad is at the same time offensive and defensive...The Islamic party 
does not hesitate to utilize the means of war to implement its goal.”90 
He says about the role of acts of worship in attaining this revolutionary 
objective: 
 
“This is the reality of that worship which people regard as merely 
prayer, fasting and dhikr (remembrance of God), and which they 
believe have no relationship with worldly matters, whereas in reality 
prayer, fasting, almsgiving, pilgrimage, and the remembrance of God 
are exercises to prepare one for the main act of worship.”91 
From the traditionalist perspective, since attainment of the pleasure of God 
through obedience to the Divine Will is the goal of politics, going against the Divine 
Will through compromise on the Shari’a in the means employed to attain that goal is 
self-defeating. Just like in other differences of opinion between people of knowledge 
the debates are circumscribed by what is indisputable in the Shari’a, so also are 
disagreements in the realm of politics thus constrained.  Maulana Thanvi’s criticism 
of the Non-Cooperation Movement on the grounds that enforcement of a boycott of 
 
89 Quoted by Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 128 
90 Quoted by Yvonne Haddad, Islamists and the Challenge of Pluralism, p. 10 
91 Quoted by Maulana Muhammad Yousuf Ludhianvi in Ikhtilaf-e-Ummat aur Sirat-e-
Mustaqeem/Differences in the Ummah and the Straight Path, translated by Mufti Afzal Hoosen Ilias, 
p. 170 
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foreign goods runs counter to the Shari’a reflects his deep concern with upholding the 
Sacred Law; even the slightest compromise on the Shari’a was unacceptable.92 
Maulana Madani, despite his active engagement in power politics till the 
creation of Pakistan, was equally persuaded of the status of politics as a means, and 
not as an end in itself. He was convinced that under foreign rule the ability of 
Muslims to live their lives in accordance with the Will of God was at stake and 
participation in politics, and his particular choice of strategies, was the only way to 
oust the foreign rulers and ensure that the Muslims of India could fulfill their raison 
d'être. After the creation of Pakistan and the departure of the British from India, 
however, Maulana Madani decided that continued participation in politics was no 
longer the best way to achieve the ultimate objective that had all along been guiding 
his action; that the preservation of the religion and its establishment in the lives of 
individual believers and the Muslim community as a whole could be better served 
through educational activities. Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Hind under Maulana Madani 
renounced any further involvement in political activity as it had now been “absolved 
of the responsibility that it had per force assumed” and declared that it would now 
confine itself to work in the religious, cultural, and educational spheres, this being its 
“final resolve.” 93 Before him, his predecessor Maulana Mahmood Hasan had also 
dramatically changed strategies upon his return to India from Malta in recognition of 
changed circumstances. He realized that to pursue with his previous plans of armed 
insurrection against the British would be suicidal, and threw the weight of his support 
behind the non-violent strategies and Non-Cooperation Movement of Mahatma 
 
92 Ibid, p. 53 
93 D.R.Goyal, Maulana Husain Ahmed Madani, a Biographical Study, p. 235-236 
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Gandhi, considering it the best strategy under the circumstances to achieve Indian 
independence.94 
From the opposite Deobandi camp, Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi went against 
his initial stance of staying away from organizations run by irreligious Muslims and 
lent support to the Muslim League with the intention of influencing the party most 
likely to be in power in the newly-formed Pakistan, creation of which was at that 
point imminent. His student Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani, who continued to 
participate actively in Pakistani politics after the partition of India, said while 
addressing the first Constitutional Assembly of the country: 
“You feel threatened by the mulla95 that he might gain power. But 
please understand that the mulla has no such intention. The mulla does 
not desire power; however, he does wish to make a bit of a mulla out 
of those in power.”96 
From the traditionalist perspective, Islamists are not only gravely mistaken in 
making the attainment of political power and the establishment of an ‘Islamic state’ 
the goal in itself rather than a means to attaining the pleasure of God through His 
obedience and worship, but also by adopting means that may be unacceptable from 
the point of view of the Shari’a. This is because by reversing the order of priorities, 
as explained above, they render Divine injunctions, such as those pertaining to acts of 
worship, both dispensable and alterable; the Shari’a may be tampered with while 
working towards the goal of political power, if that is what it takes. Furthermore, the 
fundamentalist/Islamist rejection of expert scholarship and a laissez-faire approach 
 
94 Ibid, p. 80-81 
95 A title for a religious person, usually a person with religious knowledge. However, in the South 
Asian context the term is used in a derogatory way to refer to a religious person as backward and 
ignorant. 
96 Justice Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, Akabir-e-Deoband Kiya Thay?/Who were the Elders of 
Deoband?, p. 77 
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towards interpreting the original sources leaves open room for all kinds of incorrect 
conclusions, sanctioning strategies, policies, arrangements, etc. that are impermissible 
from the perspective of the Shari’a. Traditionalist ulama, for instance, are unanimous 
in declaring the impermissibility of suicide bombing from the stand-point of the 
Shari’a, but Islamist/fundamentalist enthusiasts argue vehemently for its legitimacy, 
their reasoning rooted more in political justifications rather than evidence from the 
Quran and Sunnah.
As far as modernists are concerned, while they may not argue for politics as 
the end in itself, from the traditionalist view-point they are also seriously misguided 
in the goals towards which they aspire, as well as the political means that they adopt. 
Inspired by, and more familiar with, secular ideologies than the Quran and Sunnah,
modernist political thinkers conceptualize the goals of the Shari’a very broadly, and 
advocate the consistency of the goal of politics with liberal definitions of concepts 
like freedom, equality, justice, and human rights. In writing about Sir Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan, the highly influential modernist Muslim thinker who founded the Aligarh 
Movement and its associated Mohammaden Anglo-Oriental College in India around 
the same time that Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband was established, Fuad S. Naeem 
comments: 
“These ideas of progress, rationalism, scientism, and other 
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment notions have been among the 
staple beliefs of modernists, not only in India, but all over the Muslim 
world. Sayyid Ahmad Khan wanted to demonstrate to the British that 
Islam was respectable by modern Western standards, a task numerous 
modernists were to attempt after him, especially Amir Ali, and that 
Islam was not incompatible with Victorian ideals and values. This 
notion has often been repeated by modernists who present modern 
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Western values as Islamic values that the Islamic world has 
forgotten.”97 
Since the Quran and Sunnah serve as the ultimate reference points for all 
claims to legitimacy and cannot be sidestepped, Muslim modernists call for “opening 
of the doors of ijtihad,98” which is understood as independent thinking, and for a 
broadening of the scope of interpretation. From the traditionalist perspective, just as 
in the case of Islamists/fundamentalists, the interpretive exercise by laypersons and 
university-educated intellectuals rather than appropriately-trained experts in the 
relevant Islamic sciences results in the adoption of ends and means that run counter to 
the Shari’a, particularly when the outcome of the process is predetermined.    
 
POLITICS AS IJTIHAD
The traditionalist understanding of politics as a means implies that there is 
room in it for difference of opinion and alteration across time and space. However, 
these differences are justified only when they arise from sincere efforts by scholars 
with the requisite training in the Islamic sciences to interpret the Will of God, as 
contained in the Shari’a, for any given circumstance. Wherever the textual sources 
are clear enough— for instance, where the words are unambiguous and emphatic, and 
passed down through such a large number of unbroken chains of narration that a 
conspiracy to fabricate them has to be disregarded as an impossibility— there can be 
no more debate, and an acceptance of God’s injunctions becomes necessary. Where 
the sources of Shari’a are silent or unclear the aim of interpretation is to approximate 
 
97 Fuad S. Naeem, A Traditional Islamic Response to the Rise of Modernism, in Islam, 
Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, edited by Joseph E. B. Lumbard, p. 86 
98 Independent legal reasoning; the effort to extract derivative law from the original sources 
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as closely as possible the Divine Will, and the exercise of reason is qualified by what 
is clear in the primary texts. God is the ultimate moral, ethical and legal arbitrator, 
and human research and analysis, reasoning and discussion, judgment and decision-
making, are aimed not at establishing what is most pragmatic or popular, but to bring 
to light the Will of God to the best of human ability.  
It follows that the best decisions, that is, which are the ones that closest 
approximate the Divine Will as revealed in the sacred texts, can be made not by 
ordinary people but by specialists, though ordinary people may certainly give their 
input, especially as local customs (urf), and public interest (maslahah), are among 
sources of Islamic law, and the complexity of real-world situations requires that all 
concerns, interests, and perspectives are brought to the table before a decision that 
fulfills the Islamic goals of justice, stability, etc. can be made about public matters. 
However, it is the ulama and mashaikh alone, who have detailed knowledge of the 
Shari’a and expertise in different branches of the religious sciences as well as the 
sincerity of intention cultivated through rigorous spiritual training, who can best 
decide on the outcome that most closely approximates the Will of God in any given 
matter, after careful consideration of the Sacred Law as well as the concerns of the 
people, public interest, local custom, etc.  
As leaders of Muslim opinion in the sub-continent on the salient political 
issues of the day, and in promoting alternative standpoints on these issues, the 
Deobandi scholars were acting in their capacity as ulama and fuqaha. Their 
viewpoints were no doubt based on their understanding of the political situation in 
which the Muslims of India found themselves, as well as on a pragmatic 
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consideration of available options. However, the framework within which they 
evaluated the existing situation and decided on the best course of action to follow was 
that of the Shari’a, interpreted through the lens of Hanafi methodology. Since the 
course of action to adopt was not clearly specified in the Shari’a, though there may 
have been certain clear injunctions pertaining to politics that they felt bound by, it fell 
in the realm of fiqh or derivative law, and there was room for disagreement on its 
legitimacy, objectives and methods. However, this disagreement was within the 
juristic tradition to which the ulama of Deoband were proud heirs. The positions that 
the ulama took on the various issues took the form of juristic opinions or fatwas,
mostly issued in response to questions raised by Muslims wanting to follow the 
religiously correct course of action, or were embedded in shuruh (commentaries, sign. 
sharh) of the Quran and hadith. Muhammad Qasim Zaman describes commentaries 
as follows: 
“The discursive form of the commentary was, in fact, one of the 
principle means (the other was the fatwa) through which the law was 
not only elaborated but also expanded and modified to meet the 
exigencies of changing times. Commentaries allowed scholars to 
preserve the identity and authority of their school of law, their legal 
tradition, while simultaneously providing them with the means to 
make sometimes important adjustments in that tradition.”99 
The positions taken by Maulana Mahmood Hasan and later Maulana Husain 
Ahmed Madani towards the British were based on their understanding as qualified 
ulama trained in the Hanafi jurisprudential tradition of what was required of them 
Islamically under the given circumstances. When Maulana Mahmood Hasan was 
arrested in the Hijaz following his refusal to sign and lend credence to a fatwa 
99 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam, Custodians of Change, p. 38 
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declaring the Ottomans as infidels, he was interrogated by the authorities; the 
following is a telling excerpt from this dialogue: 
“Question: Why did the Sharif of Mecca arrest you? 
Answer: Because I refused to sign and endorse his fatwa (edict). 
Question: Why didn’t you endorse it? 
Answer: Because it was against the Shari’a.
Question: Was the fatwa of Abdul Haq Haqqani placed before you in India? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: What did you do with the copy of the fatwa?
Answer: I threw it away. 
Question: Why? 
Answer: Because it was against the Shari’a.”100 
Maulana Mahmood Hasan’s famous fatwa on participation in the Non-
Cooperation Movement legitimized this form of resistance from the perspective of the 
Shari’a. On the other hand Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi’s criticism of a boycott of 
foreign goods also stemmed from his desire to ensure that the Shari’a was in no way 
violated. Such difference of opinion is perfectly legitimate in the realm of fiqh, as it 
stemmed from different assessments of the same situation and a different ordering of 
priorities where an order was not specified in the Shari’a.
As far as the disagreement on the partition of India is concerned, the 
viewpoints of both Maulana Husain Ahmed Madani and his critic Maulana Zafar 
Ahmad Uthmani were firmly rooted in classical juristic discourses within the Hanafi 
school of thought. Since the first centuries of Islam, jurists have debated the legal 
status of Muslim minorities under non-Muslim rule. The Hanafis believed that a 
territory that had once been part of Dar-ul-Islam (the abode of Islam) continued to be 
so even after it fell into the hands of non-Muslims, as long as Muslims were able to 
continue practicing their religion there. The presence of Muslims in non-Muslim 
 
100 Maulana Syed Mohammad Mian, The Prisoners of Malta, p. 51-52 
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lands may even be beneficial, and at times might even fall into the categories of 
mustahab (recommended) and (wajib) obligatory; this may be, for instance, if their 
continued presence and practice of their faith amidst non-Muslims could become the 
means of calling people to Islam.101 This was clearly the reasoning on which Maulana 
Madani’s stance was based when he said: 
“Islam comprises the principles that underlie the rectitude of doctrinal, 
practical, and moral matters. It is the means not only for reforming the 
individual, but also for the regulation of the collectivity in its particular 
(household) and general (political) dimensions. It sheds light on all 
necessities of life, and it provides for all sorts of regulation. We must 
now consider whether Islam—being constituted of principles 
regulating individual and collective life, and pertaining to the relations 
between Creator and the created as well as to relations among the 
human being themselves—allows, on the basis of shared residence, 
race, color, and language, a shared nationalism with non-Muslims. 
[Does it allow a nationalism] whereby to defeat the enemy and to seek 
and promote common political, economic, commercial, agricultural, 
and military goals? [Does Islam allow] such extensive interaction as 
long as there is no threat to its basic principles? To the extent that we 
have studied the foundational texts of the Shari’a, it seems clear to us 
that, depending on the given situation, [such interaction] is at times 
obligatory,  at other time recommended, at yet others permissible, at 
others reprehensible, and in certain other circumstances it is 
forbidden.”102 
Maulana Madani, like other traditional ulama, was deeply concerned about 
the threat that British imperialism posed to the religious and cultural identity of 
Indian Muslims, and truly believed that only by working together with other religious 
communities, most significantly the Hindus, could the Muslims of the sub-continent 
be successful in their struggle against British rule. He considered an appeal to the 
bonds of shared “residence, color, race, and language” imperative to the achievement 
of this goal, and viewed calls for the creation of Pakistan as a blow to this struggle 
 
101 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam, Custodians of Change, p. 36 
102 Ibid, p. 34 
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and consequently a threat to the preservation of Islam in India. His stance was also 
premised on the conviction that Muslims as a whole comprise a single global 
community, which ought not to be divided up into territorial states.   
Maulana Madani’s advocacy of a united nationalism, and his position that to 
follow such a strategy was not merely permissible but even required for the Muslims 
of India from the perspective of the Shari’a, was based on an optimistic view of the 
religious and cultural autonomy that Muslims would enjoy in India after the end of 
British rule. His detractors, both among the Islamists and the Deobandi ulama,
criticized him for being oblivious to the dangers that a Hindu-dominated India would 
pose to Muslim religion and culture after the departure of the British; his strategy 
would defeat the purpose for which it was intended.        
This threat to the ability of Muslims to live their lives according to the Shari’a 
and to follow the Sunnah of the Prophet in a Hindu-dominated India led Maulanas 
Ashraf Ali Thanvi, Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani, and Zafar Ahmad Uthmani to assume a 
very different position, also rooted, not coincidentally, in Hanafi law. In his critique 
of Maulana Madani, embedded in his famous commentary on hadith, Maulana 
Uthmani seems to have followed the “territorial concept of law” in the Hanafi 
mazhab, whereby the territorial jurisdiction of the state defined the rights of those 
inhabiting it, in regarding political autonomy and power as necessary for the 
preservation of Islamic culture and identity. Muhammad Qasim Zaman suggests that 
while he does not explicitly say so, Maulana Uthmani seems to imply that the world-
wide Muslim community offers no guarantee for the survival of the Muslims in an 
India dominated by Hindus, nor does the existence of Muslim states elsewhere in the 
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world offer such a guarantee; the only viable way for the future of the Muslim 
community in the sub-continent to be secure is through having a state of their own. 103 
The political stances advocated by the ulama of Deoband thus emerged from 
the same process of opinion-formation that was employed to answer questions about 
other private and public aspects of believers’ lives, a process that only the ulama were 
considered adequately trained to engage in. About the optimal relationship between 
the political leadership and the religious/intellectual leadership of the Muslims 
Maulana Thanvi writes that that Prophet Muhammad was both a prophet and a 
political leader, and the rightly guided caliphs104 after him embodied both these 
aspects in their personalities. However, now both these roles have been inherited by 
different groups, with ulama being the heirs of his knowledge and his spiritual and 
moral qualities, and political leaders taking over the political dimension of his role. 
The way to bring them together, and hence to become true followers of the Prophetic 
model, is for Muslim rulers to ensure that no judgment is made without first 
consulting with, and getting the approval of, the ulama, while the ulama must lend 
their support to Muslim leaders who do so, and obey the ruler who rules according to 
the Shari’a. This, according to Maulana Thanvi, is the only way to ensure the welfare 
of the Muslims.105 
This guidance of the ulama is a critical feature of the traditionalist approach to 
Islamic political thought and makes it much different from the 
 
103 Ibid, p. 48-49 
104 The first four caliphs after the death of the Prophet, who were also among his closest companions, 
are referred to as the khulafa-e-rashideen, the rightly-guided caliphs; they were Abu Bakr, Umar, 
Uthman, and Ali. 
105 Justice Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, Hakeem-ul-Ummat Kay Siyasi Afkar/Political Thoughts of 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, p. 48-49 
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Islamist/fundamentalist and the modernist approaches, which reject the monopoly of 
religious scholars on the interpretation of the Quran and hadith and the issuing of 
religious edicts derived from the Shari’a. It also makes the traditionalist approach 
very different from Western political philosophies and ideologies such as theories of 
democracy, which aim to break the monopoly of specialists over public affairs and 
vest the authority to deliberate and make decisions in the hands of ordinary men and 
women, the rule of the majority being decisive in the case of liberal democracy.  
In the traditionalist paradigm, however, it is not the number of men and 
women that determines if their decisions are worth following, for indeed the majority 
of people follow their own desires and are not only themselves misguided but likely 
to lead others astray. Rather, it is the weight of the individuals making the decisions 
that matters, and a person of religious knowledge and piety is weightier than all the 
ignorant and corrupt individuals in the world put together. Shura (mutual 
consultation), which is promoted by modernists and Western interests alike as a 
democratic, or democracy-compatible, concept indigenous to Islam, is not an open-
ended process of consultation among laypersons, and is certainly not a mechanism to 
arrive at the will of the majority. Rather, it is a careful and conscientious 
consideration of all sides of the story by experts who best understand the will of God 
revealed in the Quran and through His Messenger, who will then decide on the course 
of action that best meets the standards set therein. 
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THE SPIRITUAL DIMENSION OF POLITICS
From the traditionalist perspective, a correct understanding of the goals and 
methods of Islamically legitimate political activity is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for fruitful engagement in politics.  According to Maulana Ashraf Ali 
Thanvi, since the ultimate purpose of Islamic politics is the attainment of the pleasure 
of God, Muslims engaging in politics must individually and collectively be sincere in 
their intention. They must defeat the enemy and acquire power motivated purely by 
the desire to please God and serve His cause; their intention must not be corrupted 
even slightly by the desire to prove themselves to others and be praised by them, to 
satisfy their own egos, or to acquire power, wealth, honor, etc. for this-worldly 
benefit.  
A much celebrated example of this paradigm is that of the famous companion 
and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad, Ali, who went on to become the fourth of the 
‘rightly-guided’ Muslim caliphs. Ali was on the verge of killing a rival in face-to-face 
combat on the battlefield when his opponent, as a last act of defiance, spat at him. 
Despite the opportunity to kill him, Ali immediately let him go and moved away from 
him. His bewildered opponent asked why he had been let go and Ali explained that 
until the time that the man had spat at him his intention in killing him as an enemy of 
God in a time of war was pure for the sake of God. However, by spitting at him the 
man had caused him to feel humiliation and anger, and now if he had proceeded to 
kill him he would have done so at least in part to avenge his ego and in a state of 
anger, and he did not want to proceed with his intention thus corrupted106.
106 Justice Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, Hakeem-ul-Ummat Kay Siyasi Afkar/Political Thoughts of 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, p. 55 
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Maulana Thanvi turns to the Prophetic model and the example of the first 
community of Muslims to find further evidence for his understanding of the 
prerequisite for political engagement. Out of the 23 years in which the Prophet 
preached his message107, during the first 13 years spent in Mecca the Muslim 
community was not given permission to fight their infidel oppressors despite 
relentless persecution, and were commanded to bear the persecution with patience. It 
is commonly understood that this restriction was imposed on the young Muslim 
community because of their paucity of resources and material weakness.  This view, 
according to Maulana Thanvi, is incorrect. After the migration to Medina the 
Muslims were allowed to fight to defend themselves even though the resources 
available to them did not increase by much; the Muslim army in the first battle with 
the Meccans after migration was severely disadvantaged in material terms, though 
they still emerged successful from the combat with the help of God.  
The real reason for prohibiting the early Muslims from retaliating was to 
allow time and provide the opportunity to train their egos; to crush their pride, 
develop self-control and patience, learn reliance upon God, purify their hearts and 
develop their souls. The migration to Medina completed their detachment from their 
worldly possessions and relationships, which they had to leave behind for the sake of 
God, and perfected their love for God. The Muslims already in Medina welcomed 
their fellow-believers with open arms and happily shared their wealth with them; their 
 
107 Prophet Muhammad was born in 570 CE, is said to have received the first revelation in 610 CE at 
the age of 40, which is when his mission began, and died 23 years later in 632 CE. The First 13 of 
those 23 years were spent in Mecca, until the Muslim community was granted permission to migrate to 
Medina. The migration to Medina marks the beginning of the Islamic lunar calendar.     
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sincerity and conduct was perfected, the tazkiya of their nafs108complete, with this 
act. Now when the Muslim community was finally given permission to adopt political 
means to achieve their objective—permission to establish a political community in 
Medina, fight wars, build alliances, enter into treaties, send and receive diplomatic 
delegations, etc.—it was because they had finally developed the sincerity, 
commitment to God, and other characteristics that were needed before politics could 
be engaged in fruitfully, in a manner that allowed it to become an effective means to 
its divinely-ordained end.              
 Mufti Taqi concludes from Maulana Thanvi’s analysis that the reason for the 
current weakness of the Muslims and the ineffectiveness of their political endeavors 
is because they have skipped over the Meccan phase of struggling against and 
conquering their own selves, and jumped straight to the Medinan phase, attempting to 
fight against and over-power the enemy. They are not prepared for this task, and their 
efforts are for that reason not merely futile, but counter-productive.109 
Maulana Husain Ahmed Madani expressed similar understanding of the 
conditions for the attainment and right use of power in his presidential address at a 
session of the Jamiat-e-ulama-e-Hind held less than a year after the partition of India. 
He said: 
 “Muslims are feeling dejected that they are losing power. They are 
surprised why it is so when they are still Muslims and wonder whether 
the holy promises have become dated or the teachings of Islam were 
not God-given. How I wish Muslims to understand that power has 
never been treated as the attribute of Islam; rather, right moral conduct 
has been the precondition for power. If Muslims want the revival of 
 
108 This is the same Tazkiyat-e- nafs that is among the most important goals of Tasawwuf. Maulana 
Thanvi identifies tazkiya of the nafs as a necessary prerequisite for fruitful engagement in politics.  
109 Justice Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, Hakeem-ul-Ummat Kay Siyasi Afkar/Political Thoughts of 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, p. 53-57 
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their lost prestige and survival of their dying culture, the primary 
condition is that they should cultivate good conduct in life in 
accordance with the conditions followed by the companions of the 
Prophet and mentioned in Surah Hijr110.”111 
Those of the ulama of Deoband who participated in politics themselves 
embodied this ideal of the eradication of the egoistic self and purity of intention that 
they considered to be preconditions for effective participation in politics. At the peak 
of their public disagreement with each other, Maulana Madani and Maulana Thanvi 
continued to love and respect each other, truly considering each other to be fellow-
travelers headed towards the same goal. It is recorded that one day Maulana Madani 
expressed to some fellow teachers at Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband the desire to visit 
Maulana Thanvi in his hometown of Thanah Bhawan, for it had been a while since he 
last saw him. Thereafter he set out for the purpose of this visit with a few colleagues. 
The train arrived late at night in Thanah Bhawan, and by the time the visitors reached 
Maulana Thanvi’s khanqah112, its doors had been locked for the night. Maulana 
Madani knew that the khanqah followed a strict schedule and did not consider it 
appropriate to disrupt that timetable, nor did he want to disturb Maulana Thanvi at his 
home this late at night. He preferred to instead sleep with his companions on the hard 
floor under the open sky in the courtyard outside the door of the khanqah.
The next morning when Maulana Thanvi walked from his home towards the 
khanqah for the pre-dawn prayer, he saw the men lying outside; upon discovering 
who they were he was delighted to see them but saddened that they had spent the 
 
110 The name of a chapter of the Quran 
111 D.R.Goyal, Maulana Husain Ahmed Madani, a Biographical Study, p. 234 
112 A khanqah is an institute where disciples of a particular Sufi master spend time in the company of 
their teacher and receive spiritual training     
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night outside in such discomfort. When asked why they had slept in the courtyard, 
Maulana Madani told him that they had not wanted to disrupt the timings of the 
khanqah, to which Maulana Thanvi replied that the doors to his home were always 
open for them. Maulana Madani explained that they had not wished to disturb him at 
home either. The visitors stayed in Thanah Bhawan for a day or two before returning 
home.113 
The Islamists/fundamentalists and modernists from this vantage point are not 
only misguided by rejecting the expertise of the ulama in interpreting the Shari’a,
they are also misled by the demands of their nafs and their desire for worldly gains, 
having rejected the spiritual training imparted by mashaikh of Tasawwuf, which is the 
surest, perhaps only, way to attain the purity of intention and selflessness that the 
traditionalist ulama consider as a condition for fruitful engagement in politics. 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi said about this deficiency in the modernist orientation: 
“In the case of our modernists, besides the paucity of knowledge, the 
pursuit of one’s desires is the thickest veil which conceals the truth 
from their eyes.”114 
Since traditional Islam alone offers the recommended mix of comprehensive and deep 
knowledge of the religious sciences and rigorous spiritual training, only by operating 
within the traditionalist paradigm is politics a legitimate and effective means to 
achieving the divinely-ordained purpose of human existence, the purpose for which 
the teachings of Islam were revealed. Writes Joseph Lumbard in this regard: 
“In order for the malaise of the Islamic world to be fully addressed and 
the radical reform movements to be brought back into the fold of the 
 
113 Justice Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, Akabir-e-Deoband Kiya Thay?/Who were the Elders of 
Deoband?, p. 84-85 
114 Fuad S. Naeem, A Traditional Islamic Response to the Rise of Modernism, in Islam, 
Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, edited by Joseph E. B. Lumbard, p. 96 
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Islamic tradition, the ihsani115 intellectual tradition needs to be 
accorded its proper place in a way of life that is fully and truly Islamic. 
In applying the principles of Islam to the modern world, while 
avoiding the passionate rhetorical battles which rage around them, the 
representatives of this tradition exemplify this saying of Abu Sa’id b. 
Abi ‘l-Khayr: “A [true] man is one who sits and rises among others, 
sleeps and eats, and interacts with others in the bazaar, buying and 
selling, who mixes with people, yet for one moment is not forgetful of 
God in his heart.” But such a path is not achieved by focusing upon 
reform of the world, of Islam, or of one’s nation. It is first and 
foremost a reform of one’s self.”116 
The author quotes the famous contemporary Muslim philosopher, Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr, who has written in Islam and the Plight of Modern Man:
“…the real reform of the world begins with the reform of oneself. He 
who conquers himself conquers the world, and he in whom the 
renewal of the principles of Islam in their full amplitude has taken 
place has already taken the most fundamental step toward the 
“renaissance” of Islam itself, for only he who has become resurrected 
in the Truth can resurrect and revive the world about him, whatever 
the extent of that “world” might be according to the Will of 
Heaven.”117 
The necessity of inner reform at the individual level as a prerequisite for 
effecting change in the outside world is expressed in this oft-quoted verse of the 
Quran: “Verily, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change 
what is in themselves.”118 It is perhaps in recognition of this principle that the ulama 
who founded the Deobandi reform movement focused on popular education in both 
the legal and spiritual realms, teaching ordinary Muslims the outward fiqh as well as 
encouraging and guiding their spiritual development. This, it was probably hoped, 
would result in the inner revolution needed before political action could be taken to 
 
115 By this the author means Sufism, because it involves the beautification of one’s character and 
consequently one’s actions, the word ihsan meaning beauty. 
116 Joseph E. B. Lumbard, The Decline of Knowledge and the Rise of Ideology, in Islam, 
Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, edited by Joseph E. B. Lumbard, p. 70 
117 Ibid, p. 71 
118 Chapter 13, Verse 11 of the Holy Quran 
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throw off the yoke of British rule and enable the Muslims of the sub-continent to live 
their lives in accordance with the Shari’a, and fulfill their purpose for which they 
were created. At the height of the political struggle of the Muslims in India, Maulana 
Ashraf Ali Thanvi was approached by a Muslim political activist and offered to be 
made Ameer-ul-Momineen119 (Leader of the Faithful); he replied:  
“The first order that I would issue as the Ameer-ul-Momineen would 
be to stop all kinds of political activity for ten years. In these ten years 
there would be attempts to rectify Muslims. When this reform has been 
achieved to a satisfactory extent, then I would give any other 
commands.”120 
This inner change also results in bringing about wider social and political 
change in another way, other than by preparing individuals for rightly guided political 
action. Maulana Thanvi suggests that in a Muslim country where laws are in effect 
that run counter to the Shari’a, if conscientious Muslims consistently refuse to 
participate in Islamically illegitimate transactions, despite material setbacks, then the 
government will be forced to make changes in the law. He gives as an example the 
simultaneous refusal of individuals to put their money in interest-bearing bank 
accounts, of professionals to work in other than Islamic banks, and of businessmen 
and women to take on loans on interest, which would eventually cause the non-
Islamic interest-based financial system to be replaced by one based on Islamic 
principles. Such sustained effort requires commitment to the Shari’a, an acute sense 
of accountability before God and concern about one’s fate in the Hereafter, and a lack 
of attachment to worldly possessions so that material losses can be incurred without 
 
119 Title given traditionally to the Caliph of the Muslims   
120 Justice Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, Akabir-e-Deoband Kiya Thay?/Who were the Elders of 
Deoband?, p. 56 
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remorse; the Will of God must first be actualized in his own self before a believer can 
take a stand for it in the outside world.121 
SUMMARY
The nature of the involvement of the ulama of Deoband in the leading 
political movements of the day and the considerations that led them to take their 
respective positions vis-à-vis each other reveals three important aspects of 
traditionalist political thought. First, that politics, as a facet of human life on earth, is 
a means to achieve the same non-political end towards which all of a believer’s life is 
geared: the attainment of God’s pleasure through complete submission to His will as 
enshrined in the revealed Law and exemplified by the Prophetic example, which leads 
to attainment of a deep connection with Him in this world, and success in the 
Hereafter. Although this goal is indisputable, universal and timeless, the way to 
achieve it is open to debate and change. Indeed, room for change is imperative in the 
means as the best strategy under one set of circumstances may seriously compromise 
the goal if adopted in another. In the realm of politics, determination of the 
effectiveness of political engagement as a means to the desired end and of the 
particular strategy that would be most expedient is open to debate, not just because of 
scholarly disagreement about what a particular scriptural injunction implies, but also 
because of differing assessments of the situation at hand.  
 Given the end towards which politics is aimed, traditionalists argue that all 
decisions must be in line with the sacred Law; if the goal is to attain the pleasure of 
 
121 Justice Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, Hakeem-ul-Ummat Kay Siyasi Afkar/Political Thoughts of 
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, p. 72-73 
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God through obedience to His Will, one cannot choose a course of action that 
compromises the Shari’a. This necessarily implies that since the people best placed to 
ensure that the limits set by the Shari’a are not transgressed are the ulama; just as 
they issue edicts in response to questions in other realms of a believer’s life, such as 
about the manner of prayer or the method of divorce or the proper way to conduct a 
business transaction, so also are they best-qualified to guide political leaders, both 
incumbent and in the opposition, as well as the general public, in the realm of politics. 
Therefore, in the traditionalist framework, while the ulama do not themselves have to 
participate directly in politics—indeed it may be desirable for them to avoid direct 
engagement—their authority must be deferred to by all political actors. Sometimes, 
however, if the costs of abstaining from direct involvement in politics outweigh the 
benefits, ulama may be forced to become players in the political game themselves. 
Mufti Taqi Uthmani says about the political scene in Pakistan immediately after its 
creation: 
“It has always been the policy of the ulama to abstain from 
participation in elections and from positions of power, and if those in 
power had accepted the joint recommendation of all the ulama in the 
country regarding the implementation of Islamic Law there would 
have been no need for any religious scholar to participate in politics. 
But alas this did not happen and afterwards some honorable ulama 
were forced into participation in electoral politics.”122 
What is supreme is the pleasure and Will of God, and whatever course of action 
maximizes that goal must be followed. 
 It also follows that for individual political actors the goal of attaining God’s 
pleasure can only be reached if there is purity of intention behind their involvement in 
 
122 Justice Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, Akabir-e-Deoband Kiya Thay?/Who were the Elders of 
Deoband?, p. 77 
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politics, otherwise even the most rightly-guided of actions will be useless for their 
individual salvation. For political actors to have hearts purified of selfishness, greed, 
arrogance, anger etc. and filled with commitment to God is also necessary for 
political action to be conducive to its goal since only then can it be ensured that they 
will not compromise the goal itself or adherence to the Shari’a for personal worldly 
gains or the satisfaction of their egos, and will work according to the political 
strategies recommended by the ulama towards the achievement of their ultimate goal 
with diligence and devotion. Hence, spiritual training is a prerequisite to fruitful 
participation in politics from a traditionalist perspective, and a focus on reforming 
individuals is likely to be a more effective political strategy than a premature plunge 
into power politics. Seyyed Hossein Nasr says in this regard: 
“How often is this simple truth forgotten in the modern world where 
men want to do good without being good, to reform the world without 
reforming themselves, to exalt action and belittle contemplation, 
unaware that without observance of the above hierarchy no action can 
ever yield completely fruitful results, especially so far as human 
welfare in its broadest sense is concerned.”123 
These features of traditionalist Islamic political thought make it significantly 
different not only from contemporary secular theories of politics but also from the 
modernist and fundamentalist/Islamist orientations within Islam, which take the 
means to be the ends or are otherwise mistaken in their determination of the goals of 
politics, and reject the expertise of the ulama as well as the systematic purification of 
the self through the Islamic science of Tasawwuf.




From the traditionalist perspective, individual and collective action in every 
realm of human life must be geared towards, indeed is an opportunity to fulfill, the 
purpose for which God created human life on Earth—the attainment of His pleasure 
through compliance with His Will. For traditional Muslims, the Shari’a, the Sacred 
Law of Islam, represents the concrete embodiment of the Divine Will and to practice 
Islam means to follow the Shari’a. This Law has its roots in the Quran and the 
Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad and is immutable in its principles, yet is “a growing 
reality like a tree whose roots are firmly sunk in the earth, while its branches grow 
from season to season.”124 It is the ulama and mashaikh, linked through an 
uninterrupted chain of knowledgeable and pious individuals to the men and women 
around the Prophet and through them to their teacher and spiritual guide Prophet 
Muhammad himself, who are best able not only to identify the immutable principles 
of the Shari’a, but to derive guidance from them for every situation in which 
believers may find themselves, from the very mundane to the most extraordinary. 
Politics from this angle is no different than other aspects of human life, neither in 
being a means to the divinely-ordained end, nor in its rootedness in the Shari’a, nor
indeed in the dependence of political actors on ulama and mashaikh for legal and 
moral guidance and spiritual instruction.  
The interpretation of the Shari’a is a multifaceted yet highly integrated 
process that requires not just detailed and wide-ranging knowledge, but also a broad 
 
124 Ibid, p. 238 
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vision and penetrating insight, which is why traditionalists are so fearful of allowing 
the “doors of ijtihad” to be opened to laypersons, in particular those whose intentions 
are suspect.  For example, the stringent hudood125 laws which have become highly 
controversial for their inclusion of capital punishment are from the immutable part of 
the Shari’a. While modernists join western critics in rejecting them as archaic and 
impediments to the establishment of justice, fundamentalists may implement them 
indiscriminately and surely compromise the Islamic ideal of adl126; the understanding 
of both is highly superficial.  
The traditional ulama, following the precedent of the companions of the 
Prophet, have elaborated detailed criteria for the implementation of these laws, which 
ensure that justice is indeed established. While the hudood laws are themselves 
unchangeable, fuqaha have been very cautious in determining when these laws should 
be applied so that their implementation does not defeat the purpose for which they 
were intended; contrary to modernist allegations, they have certainly not been 
oblivious to the fact that in many circumstances the application of these laws could 
indeed be counter-productive. During his reign, Caliph Umar bin Abdul Khattab, one 
of the closest companions of Prophet Muhammad and an expert in fiqh, himself 
ordered that the hudood laws pertaining to theft be temporarily lifted at a time of 
severe drought because their implementation under the circumstances would 
compromise their intended purpose. This was not an instance of admitted failure of 
the Shari’a; rather the Shari’a itself, as the totality of beliefs, principles, priorities 
 
125 Punishments expressly in the Quran and Sunnah, and (unlike many other punishments) not subject 
to being mitigated by the ruler or the aggrieved party 
126 Justice 
81
embodying the Divine Will, required that the particular hudood laws be lifted in the 
given situation.  
In passing edicts based on the Shari’a, the fuqaha display sensitivity to local 
custom, maximize public interest, accept the lesser of two evils, pay attention to the 
findings of the latest scientific research, keep themselves informed of public opinion, 
and act in other such “enlightened” ways not at the expense of adherence to the Quran 
and Sunnah but because of it. Indeed, given the complexity and dynamism of the real 
world, the Will of God cannot be fully actualized nor the Prophetic example faithfully 
followed unless the variety of circumstances facing believers, change in these 
circumstances, and the multiple dimensions of any given situation are kept in 
consideration. Traditional ulama employ sophisticated methodologies for 
interpretation of the Shari’a that take into account a wide range of both timeless and 
temporal considerations and allow for flexibility and dynamism without 
compromising on adherence to the Quran and Sunnah.
It is because of their limited understanding of the Shari’a and lack of tools to 
interpret it that modernists consider it inadequate to meet contemporary challenges 
and call for the privatization of religion and secularization of Muslim societies, and 
the implementation of the seemingly more sound laws, policies, mechanisms and 
structures emerging from the Western world. However, given that the all-
encompassing nature of the Shari’a has caused it to permeate every sphere of life in 
Muslim countries, however selectively its rulings may have been applied and 
however perverted its interpretation, attempts at secularization and emulation of 
Western models have heightened the malaise of Muslim societies rather than 
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ameliorating it and created further disruptions and imbalances. It has also induced 
reactionary fundamentalist movements which have an equally unsophisticated view 
of the Shari’a and not only fail to offer practicable solutions to existing problems but 
make the modernist agenda look even more attractive. Seyyed Hossein Nasr assesses 
this as follows: 
“The unity of the Islamic world, however, is now partially broken as 
never before, not only politically—which had already occurred during 
the Abbasid period—but even religiously and culturally, by the erosion 
caused by Westernization, a process which in addition to introducing a 
totally foreign element into the Islamic world also reflects directly an 
alien world which itself suffers from the most glaring forms of 
disunity and contradiction. Numerous works have been written in the 
West with various degrees of success on modern movements in the 
Islamic world, but few have considered the effects of the inner 
contradictions and tensions of Western civilization itself upon the 
confusion caused in the Islamic world by present-day modernizing 
elements.”127 
Referring to the tension between ruling elites who support a secular 
understanding of the law and favor economic and political institutions based on 
Western models, and the majority of Muslims for whom drastic departures from the 
Shari’a are unacceptable and just cause for riots, revolt and confrontation as has been 
seen in Egypt and Algeria, he says:  
“This tension, which is a concrete and widespread aspect of the more 
general confrontation between traditional Islam and modernity, has led 
in recent decades to activist movements which employ Western 
political ideologies and methods and yet oppose the West and which 
have been dubbed as “fundamentalism,” a most unfortunate term that 
has nevertheless become prevalent….As long as the pressure of 
modernism and now also post-modernism upon the Islamic world 
continues and this tension is not resolved within Islamic societies, 
confrontations to which the world has been witness in recent years will 
continue.”128 
127 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, p. 124 
128 Ibid, p. 239 
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 Traditionalist methodology offers balanced resolutions to this tension, 
avoiding the excesses of modernism on the one hand and fundamentalism on the 
other, pegging solutions to contemporary problems firmly in tradition while 
responding to the needs and challenges of the modern world. Theirs is an approach 
that does not blindly reject modernity but rather engages it, accepting those aspects of 
it that are not contrary to the Shari’a and its goals, indeed embracing elements that 
are conducive to the attainment of the desired ends. The founders of Dar-ul-Uloom 
Deoband did so in choosing a modern institutional structure for their madrassah, and 
the ulama of Deoband did so in the alliances they built, the political tools they 
adopting, and in supporting the creating of a modern nation-state. However, where an 
acceptance of modernity threatens identity, which from the traditionalist perspective 
in defined through linkages with the past, traditionalist ulama display a wariness of 
modernity, modern society being defined by Anthony Giddens as “a society, more 
technically, a complex of institutions, which unlike any preceding culture lives in the 
future rather than in the past.”129 
The traditionalist approach also offers solutions to the social and political 
problems plaguing the Muslim world in another way. Politics in Muslim countries 
with few, if any, exceptions is characterized by a deeply-entrenched and self-
perpetuating culture of corruption, participation in politics being motivated almost 
entirely by the desire for wealth and power. Western models of political organization 
take as a given this motivation of political actors and propose mechanisms and 
structures designed to rein in impulses like greed and selfishness and minimize the 
 
129 Quoted in Fareeha Khan, Being Muslim in Pre-Partition India: Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi’s 
Negotiation of Identity and Politics, p. 1 
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damage caused by them. The Shari’a also acknowledges the need for building 
preventive mechanisms and checks and balances into the system, for instance when it 
allocates in advance a specified share of the zakat130 collected in any given year to the 
zakat collectors to reduce their incentive to embezzle funds. However, it does not rely 
on such measures alone and offers a tried and tested method of individual reform that 
has since the beginning of Islam purified believing men and women of their negative 
impulses and infused them with positive states, preparing them to work sincerely 
towards the divinely-ordained end in accordance with the Shari’a, in every sphere of 
life. Seyyed Hossein Nasr says about the success of the tradition of Islamic 
spirituality in achieving this particular goal: 
“The unitary principle of Islam, however, could not permit this 
contemplative way to become crystallized as a separate social 
organization outside the matrix molded by the injunctions of the 
Divine Law or Shari’ah. It had to remain as an inner dimension of that 
Law and institutionally as an organization integrated into the Islamic 
social pattern and inseparable from it. As a result, contemplatives of 
the highest order have often combined their life of contemplation with 
the most intense forms of activity, and throughout Islamic history 
outstanding Sufis have been known to be scholars, artists, teachers, 
and even administrators and rulers. In such cases, the inner 
contemplative life has intensified and given meaning to their acts 
rather than in diminishing their efficiency or appropriateness.”131 
Indeed, believers whose hearts are purged of negative impulses like arrogance, 
greed, lust for power, selfishness, attachment to the world and filled with love for 
God and sincere commitment to attaining His pleasure will not be at peace upon 
witnessing the flagrant violation of the Divine Will around them; they will be forced 
by their own conscience and their love for God to participate in a process of change in 
the status quo through whatever legitimate means necessary. It was precisely this 
 
130 Islamic alms-tax paid annually on one’s accumulated wealth 
131 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, p. 109 
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commitment to God and His Will as enshrined in the Shari’a that compelled the 
ulama of Deoband to participate in politics, even though they may have, as in the case 
of Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, initially advised against it, and to even adopt 
positions in opposition to each other.  
 From the traditionalist perspective, politics is not merely limited to the here 
and now. It is, in fact, intimately linked to the transcendent Reality which is both the 
Source and the End of human life in its entirety, politics being but one facet of the 
whole. While academics, both Muslim and non-Muslim, who have attempted to study 
Islamic political thought have not paid attention to the sacred element of politics and 
the spiritual dimension of political activity, this has been at the expense of ignoring 
the traditionalist framework. The ulama of Deoband operationalized this framework 
and in doing so demonstrated the viability of the traditionalist approach to politics in 





Ahl-as-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah: “People of the Way (of the Prophet) and the community 
(of His companions),” also referred to as Sunnis; that majority of Muslims which 
accept the authority of the whole first generation of Muslims and the validity of the 
historical community, in contrast with factions like the Kharijis and the Shi’ah. Those 
professing adherence to the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad and to the agreed upon 
norms and practices of the universal Muslim community 
 
Ahl-e-Hadith: “The people (or, partisans) of hadith. The Ahl-e-Hadith, who emerged 
in late-nineteenth century colonial India, denied the authority of all Sunni schools of 
law and insisted rather on the exclusive and unmediated authority of the Quran and 
hadith and the sources of all guidance. 
 
Alim (pl. Ulama): A learned man, in particular one formally trained in the religious 
sciences, especially but not exclusively in Islamic law and hadith 
Dars-e-Nizami: A syllabus of religious education current in South Asia from the 
eighteenth century 
 
Dar-ul-Islam: lands under Muslim rule; later, any lands in which Muslim institutions 
are maintained, whether or not under Muslim rule. It is the converse of Dar-ul-Harb,
the “lands of wars” 
 
Dar-ul-Uloom: A place of advanced religious learning, superior to a madrassah 
Fatwa: A legal opinion issued by a jurisconsult (mufti) on a point of law 
 
Fiqh: Islamic law and jurisprudence; the discipline of elucidating the Shari’a; also the 
resultant body of rules  
 
Faqih (pl. Fuqaha): An expert in fiqh; a scholar of Islamic law 
 
Hadith: The sayings of the Prophet Muhammad based on the authority of a chain of 
transmitters, regarded by Muslims as second to the Quran as a source of religious law 
and guidance 
 
132 Adapted from the glossaries in Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 
1860-1900, p. 361-368, and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam, 
Custodians of Change, p. 259-262 
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Haji: One who has performed the Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca that is obligatory 
upon every able-bodied and financially capable Muslim man and woman once in a 
lifetime 
Hanafi: Referring to the Sunni legal mazhab ascribed to Abu Hanifa (699-767 CE); 
most Sunni Muslims in South Asia belong to this school of law. 
 
Hazrat: Presence, dignity, a title applied to any great person 
 
Hudood (sig. hadd): Punishments expressly in the Quran and Sunnah, and (unlike 
many other punishments) not subject to being mitigated by the ruler or the aggrieved 
party  
 
Ijazah: Permission; formal authorization to transmit a particular religious text or 
religious learning in general 
 
Ijtihad: Systematic reflection on the foundational sources of the law to arrive at legal 
rulings on matters not already or explicitly determined by sacred Law by a mujtahid,
a person qualified for the inquiry.  
 
Isnad: Chain of transmission 
 
Khanqah: A space for Sufi activities, whose resident engage in meditative practices 
and the remembrance of God, and where one or more Sufi masters live and teach their 
disciples. 
 
Madrassah: A school for ulama; an institute of religious learning 
 
Manqulat: the “copied” subjects, Quran and hadith, as distinguished from ma’qulat,
which are the products of man reasoning. 
 
Ma’qulat: See manqulat above 
 
Maulana: “Our Protector,” a title given to a person respected for religious learning 
 
Mazhab: In Sunni Law, one of the four equally legitimate schools of law: Hanafi, 
Hanbali, Shafi’i, and Maliki 
 
Milla: A community as defined by ties of faith 
 
Mufti: An expert in the science of giving Islamic legal verdicts 
 
Naqshbandi: The Sufi path of those initiated into the chain of succession of 
Baha’uddin Naqshband, tracing back to Prophet Muhammad through his closest 
companion and the first Muslim caliph after his death, Abu Bakr  
 
Qadi: A state-appointed Muslim judge who rules according to the Shari’a 
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Qawm: Nation as defined by ties of ethnicity, shared territory, and language 
Salik: A traveler on the spiritual path 
Sanad: A diploma, testimonial, certificate 
 
Shaikh (pl. mashaikh): A title for a Sufi master 
 
Sharh (pl. Shuruh): A commentary on a religious text 
 
Shari’a: the whole body of rules guiding the life of a Muslim, in law, ethics, and 
etiquette; sometimes called sacred Law. The provisions of the Shari’a are worked out 
through the discipline of fiqh on the basis of usul-ul-fiqh (principles or sources of 
fiqh).  
 
Sufi: A Muslim mystic  
 
Sunnah: The way of Prophet Muhammad, his normative example. It includes his 
actions and sayings and his tacit approval on the actions or sayings of another, and 
encompasses both his external acts and his internal states. 
 
Sunni: See Ahl-as-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah 
 
Taqlid: Adherence to the legal rulings of earlier scholars, or of the school of law to 
which one professes adherence 
Tasawwuf: See Sufi; the traditional Islamic science of the purification of the heart and 
soul, the commonest term for that aspect of Islam which cultivates spiritual 
development 
 
Tazkiyat-e- nafs: Purification of the Self; a central goal of Islamic spirituality 
 
Ulama: see alim 
Ummah: The worldwide community of Muslims 
 
Wahabi: An adherent of the puritanical teachings of the eighteenth-century Arab 
reformer Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (d. 1791)  
 
Zakat: Islamic alms-tax paid annually on one’s accumulated wealth; one of the five 
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